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RUMPKE OF INDIANA, INC. v. CUMMINS ENGINE CO.:
THE POTENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE PARTY'S RIGHT
TO FULL COST RECOVERY IS EXPANDED
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrialism in the United States expanded at such a rapid
rate in the first half of the Twentieth Century that Congress was
eventually forced to enact several statutes to protect the environ-
ment.1 In 1980, after several other statutes had already been
passed, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).2 With the pas-
1. See 1 ALLAN J. TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 1.1 (1992). The United States became the world leader in industrial power in
the 1970s. See id. Congress addressed the social problems caused by the industrial-
ization movement by regulating securities, antitrust, labor and transportation
through legislation. See id. Environmental concerns were not addressed until after
the first "Earth Day," which took place on April 22, 1970. See id. In response to
this showing of public concern for the environment, Congress passed the Clean
Water Act, the Clean Air Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA). See id. While these laws have played significant roles in protecting the
environment, they did not address the contamination that resulted from the re-
lease of chemicals nor did they address the problems associated with abandoned
and inactive disposal sites. See id.
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994)) [hereinafter CERCLA]. Congress enacted CERCLA in
response to the severe harms to the environment and public health that resulted
from the improper disposal of hazardous waste. See Borough of Sayreville v. Union
Carbride Corp., 923 F. Supp. 671, 676 (D.N.J. 1996); see also Michael P. Healy,
Direct Liability for Hazardous Substance Cleanups Under CERCLA: A Comprehensive Ap-
proach, 42 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 65, 68 (1992). During the 1970s, several well-publi-
cized incidents of improper disposal of large amounts of hazardous wastes
occurred. See id. at 68-69. These incidents were significant because they each
caused serious health problems which led to an interest in and support for the
establishment of CERCLA. See id. "Among these incidents were Love Canal in
New York, the 'Valley of the Drums' in Kentucky, and the James River kepone [sic]
discharges in Virginia." Id. Love Canal had been built as part of an electrical
power project and was used by Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corporation
(Hooker) to dispose of hundreds of drums of chemicals. See TOPOL & SNow, supra
note 1, at § 1.1 n.10. Hooker later donated the land to the Niagara Falls Board of
Education. See id. A school building was then constructed on the site and single
family homes were built on the land adjacent to the site. See id. Both the school
building and the homes had to be abandoned after the contamination was discov-
ered. See id. It was the condition of this abandoned site that led Congress to recog-
nize that the existing legislation did not adequately address this type of
contamination. See id. at 3-4.
As originally enacted, CERCLA was intended to "address what many believed
to be a limited problem," and provided the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) with a $1.6 billion fund, called the "Superfund," to study and clean up the
(511)
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sage of CERCLA, Congress intended to address the gaps that other
statutes had left with respect to the regulation of hazardous waste
sites.3 Such legislation was, and still is, necessary because of the
astronomical cost to clean up a contaminated site.4 At present,
there are approximately 1,500 sites on the National Priorities List
(NPL),5 and estimates show that the average cost to clean up just
designated hazardous waste sites. H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), at 74 (1985), reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2836. "Most believed that cleaning up a site was rela-
tively inexpensive and involved removing containers or scraping a few inches of
soil off the ground." Id. Within five years after the enactment of CERCLA, how-
ever, legislatures understood that a cleanup could go "far beyond simple removal
of barrels" and it may often involve "years of pumping contaminated water from
aquifers." Id. In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA with the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), increasing the Superfund to $8.5 billion.
See Lorelei Joy Borland, Superfund: An Overview, in INTRODUCrION TO ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAw 15, 17 (1990) (discussing necessity of amendments). For further discus-
sion of SARA, see infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
how a site becomes designated for cleanup, see infta note 5.
3. See Jason E. Panzer, Note, Apportioning CERCLA Liability: Cost Recovery or
Contribution, Where Does a PRP Stand?, 7 FoPDHAM ENvTL. L.J. 437, 439 (1996).
CERCLA "substantially changed the legal machinery used to enforce environmen-
tal cleanup efforts and was enacted to fill gaps left in ... the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act of 1976 ('RCRA')." Id. (quoting Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden,
Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989)). The Fifth Circuit in Amoco Oil stated that
"RCRA left inactive sites largely unmonitored by the EPA unless they posed an
imminent hazard. CERCLA addressed this problem 'by establishing a means of
controlling and financing both governmental and private responses to hazardous
releases at abandoned and inactive waste disposal sites.'" Amoco Oil 889 F.2d at 667
(quoting Bulk Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (S.D.
Fla. 1984)). Congress's concern with the gaps left by the other environmental stat-
utes is evidenced by the following excerpt:
After having previously focused on air and water pollutants, the Congress,
in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, provided a pro-
spective cradle-to-grave regulatory regime governing the movement of
hazardous waste in our society. Since enactment of that law, a major new
source of environmental concern has surfaced: the tragic consequences
of improperly, negligently, and recklessly hazardous waste disposal prac-
tices known as the "inactive hazardous waste site program." The unfortu-
nate human health and environmental consequence of these practices
has received national attention amidst growing public and congressional
concern over the magnitude of the problem and the appropriate course
of response that should be pursued. Existing law is clearly inadequate to
deal with this massive problem.
H.R. REP. No. 96-1016(I), at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120.
4. See Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 107 F.3d 1235, 1236
(7th Cir. 1997) (stating "astronomical sums needed to restore [hazardous) sites
can deter prompt remedial action"). Commentators have argued, however, that
CERCLA will not impose an "overwhelmingly large financial burden" on many in-
dustries. See KATHERINE N. PROBST ET AL., FOOTING THE BILL FOR SUPERFUND CLEAN-
ups 9 (1995). For example, the estimated cost of cleanups in the chemical industry
in 1995 was $394 million. See id. The estimated profits for that same year were
over $20 billion. See id.
5. See Superfund: EPA - Claimed Improvements to CERCLA Misleading Political Con-
sulting Group Says, Chemical Regulation Daily (BNA) (July 15, 1997); see also LISA
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one site is $29.1 million. 6 Unfortunately, to date, only 419 sites out
of the 1,500 sites on the NPL have been remediated. 7
CERCLA has been criticized as being an overly complex piece
of legislation with "a well deserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted
provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative his-
WEEKLY COULTER ET AL., THE SURETY'S ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 2 (Donald G. Gavin &
Robert M. Wright eds., 1997). The National Priorities List (NPL) is a roster used
to identify the nation's hazardous waste sites. See ToPOL & SNOW, supra note 1, at
§ 2.4. The list originally acted as a priority list, ranking the top four hundred haz-
ardous sites in the United States that required the most attention. See id. Congress
intended the NPL to serve as a "quick and inexpensive method of identifying sites
that warranted further investigation under CERCLA." Id. The manner in which
sites are selected to be placed on the NPL has raised constitutional challenges. See
id. at § 2.1. Once an individual proposes to place a site on the NPL, there is no
opportunity for a hearing before it is actually placed on the NPL. See id. Many
have argued that this is a violation of due process. See id.
6. See Superfund: EPA - Claimed Improvements to CERCLA Misleading Political Con-
sulting Group Says, supra note 5 (stating "[t]hirty percent of the total number of
sites on the National Priorities List - 419 sites - have reached EPA's definition of
'construction complete' midway through fiscal 1997"); see also PROBST ET AL., supra
note 4, at 132. Experts used three components to estimate the cleanup cost for
each site, namely, remedial action costs, site assessment costs, and operation and
maintenance costs. See id. at 129. These experts based the estimated cleanup cost
on EPA data gathered in 1993 and a report from the University of Tennessee's
Waste Management Research and Education Institute. See id.
In 1994, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the total cost of
cleaning up all current and future NPL sites ranged from $106 billion to $462.9
billion. See id. at 18. Annual spending in the United States through the Superfund
is estimated to be $6 billion, which includes expenditures by all parts of the federal
government and all spending by private parties for cleanup and transaction costs.
See id. at 11. This figure, however, is considerably small in comparison to the
amount spent by other federal environmental regulatory programs. See id. The $6
billion spending represents less than five percent of the $135 billion spent each
year in the United States to comply with all environmental regulations. See id.
7. See COULTER, supra note 5, at 2. Critics claim that CERCLA has not met the
expectations that surrounded the legislation when it was enacted. See id. In 1980,
when CERCIA was enacted, "it was no doubt expected that by 1995 most sites
would have been remediated." Id. The rate at which new sites have been added to
the NPL, however, has decreased in recent years. See PROBST ET AL., supra note 4, at
20. Most analysts believe that the reason that most sites have not been remediated
is because EPA cannot handle a rapid increase in the volume of NPL sites. See id.
These analysts claim the maximum number of sites that will be included on the
NPL will be between 2,000 and 3,000 sites, which will be cleaned up in the next
twenty to thirty years. See id.
When Congress enacted CERC[A, EPA expected to engage in 400 cleanups
across the country for a total cost of $1.6 billion. See COULTER, supra note 5, at 2.
Estimates, however, show that even though far fewer sites have engaged in cleanup
than was originally expected, $24 billion has been expended. See id. Expenses
toward litigation pertaining to who will be responsible for these costs has ac-
counted for an estimated 20% to 30% of this total cost. See id. at 2-3; see also ToPOL
& SNow, supra note 1, at v (indicating amount of money "allocated by the federal
government for cleanup projects may constitute the largest public works effort in
the history of the world").
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tory."8 CERCLA's liability system has recently become a major
source of controversy. 9 In particular, courts have been divided on
whether to allow a private potentially responsible party (PRP)' 0 to
bring an action against other PRPs for the recovery of all costs in-
curred in the cleanup of a hazardous waste site. 1 '
8. United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985); see also Loui-
siana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 358, 360 (W.D. Wash. 1990) ("The
CERCLA statute is extensive and complicated and the language of the statute has
been criticized by many courts."); see also PROBST ET AL., supra note 4, at 1 ("Com-
plaints about Superfund come from municipal officials, bankers, and many other
individuals, corporations, and other entities that have either generated or trans-
ported hazardous substances during the past 100 years or that have owned and
operated the disposal sites or other facilities where contamination remains.");
Michael V. Hernandez, Cost Recovery or Contribution?: Resolving the Controversy over
CERCLA Claims Brought by Potentially Responsible Parties, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 83
(1997) (stating that in comparison to CERCLA, "[flew statutes have generated
more controversy and litigation"); Mark A. Stach, Only "Innocent" Parties Need Apply:
The Death of Private Party Cost Recovery Actions Under Superfund?, 20 WM. & MARY
ENvrL. L. & POL'Y REV. 33, 35-36 (discussing confusion that revolves around CER-
CLA); Panzer, supra note 3, at 437-38 (recognizing CERCLA as "an imprecise tool"
used to address hazardous waste sites); cf. ToPOL & SNOW, supra note 1, at 1 (stat-
ing CERCLA has been dubbed "Lawyers Welfare and Relief Act of 1980" and "has
created unprecedented professional opportunities for hydrologists, engineers and
lawyers").
Commentators have also criticized CERCLA for the following reasons:
(a) That the liability system is unfair and has resulted in excessive litiga-
tion and other transaction costs;
(b) That the remedy selection process has delayed clean-up action and
increased clean-up costs unnecessarily;
(c) That the states and local citizens do not have the ability to fully par-
ticipate in the selection and implementation of appropriate reme-
dies; and
(d) That the stigma of being a former superfund site creates economic
disincentives for the redevelopment and reuse of contaminated
properties.
COULTER, supra note 5, at 3.
9. See Panzer, supra note 3, at 440. One critic noted that the "absence of de-
finitive guidance from Congress has resulted in discord among recent court deci-
sions and has propelled the issue apportioning liability to the forefront of
CERCLA litigation." Id. at 441. The controversy arises when two or more parties
are responsible for the contamination of a single site. See David G. Manselbaum,
Toward a Superfund Cost Allocation Principle, 3 ENVTL. L. 117 (1996). Parties cannot
decide among themselves how the costs of a site cleanup should be allocated be-
cause each party has its own concept of what is fair. See id. This has resulted in a
high volume of litigation over the proper allocation of costs. See id. The courts,
however, have provided little guidance in determining what may be considered an
equitable allocation of the costs. See id. For a general discussion of the controversy
that exists in characterizing claims brought under CERCLA, see Hernandez, supra
note 8, at 83-85.
10. SeeCERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). Potentially responsible
parties (PRPs) are parties which fall within one of the categories of persons liable
under section 107(a) of CERCLA for the cleanup costs of a hazardous site. See id.
For a discussion of the categories of PRPs, see infra note 28.
11. See Steven F. Baicker-McKee & James M. Singer, Narrowing the Roads of
Private Cost Recovery: Recent Developments Limiting the Recovery of Private Response Costs
4
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RUMPKE
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co.1 2 held that Rumpke of
Indiana (Rumpke) was entitled to bring an action against another
PRP for the recovery of all costs incurred in the cleanup of the Un-
iontown Landfill. 13 The Seventh Circuit held that a landowner of a
hazardous site who alleged it did not participate in the contamina-
tion of the site was entitled to bring such an action. 14 While courts
have not yet settled the issue of whether a PRP may bring an action
for full recovery, the decision in Rumpke is inconsistent with the es-
tablished decisional trends.15
This Note addresses the controversy that exists surrounding
whether PRPs are entitled to bring actions for full cost recovery
against other PRPs. Part II presents the background of CERCLA
and how courts have ruled on the controversy. 16 Part III discusses
the facts of Rumpke.17 Next, Part IV analyzes the Seventh Circuit's
decision to allow a PRP to bring an action for full recovery of
cleanup costs, as well as the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in deter-
mining the scope of a consent decree.1 8 Part V critically analyzes
the Seventh Circuit's decision. 19 Finally, Part VI addresses the im-
Under CERCLA § 107, 25 Envd. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,593 (1995) (discussing
how courts recently "have questioned" whether PRP may bring action to recover all
costs). Circuit courts have recently been limiting PRPs to the recovery of only
those costs which could be proven attributable to a specific party. See id. Some
district courts, however, have allowed PRPs to recover all costs from any party
found responsible for any portion of the contamination. See id. For an analysis of
how the courts have addressed claims by PRPs for total cost recovery, see infra
notes 53-96 and accompanying text. For a general discussion on how the circuit
and district courts decided this issue in 1994 and 1995, see Stach, supra note 8, at
48-78.
12. 107 F.3d 1235 (7th Cir. 1997).
13. See generally id. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in
Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v. Cummings Engine Co., see infra notes 110-28 and accompa-
nying text.
14. See id. at 1240-41. For a discussion of the "innocent landowner exception"
applied by the Seventh Circuit, see infra notes 148-64 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of how the decision in Rumpke differs from the trends of
the other courts, see infra notes 129-75 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of CERCLA and how the courts have addressed a PRP's
action against other PRPs, see infra notes 21-96 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the facts of Rumpke, see infra notes 97-109 and accom-
panying text.
18. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Rumpke, see infra
notes 110-28 and accompanying text.
19. For a critique of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Rumpke, see infra notes
129-78 and accompanying text.
1998]
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plications and the potential effects of the Seventh Circuit's ruling in
Rumpke.20
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Development of CERCLA
Congress had two primary purposes in the enactment of CER-
CLA, namely, to encourage the prompt and voluntary cleanup of
hazardous waste sites, and to impose the costs of cleanup on parties
responsible for the contamination. 21 In order to meet Congress's
goals, many courts have determined that CERCLA must be inter-
preted broadly and liberally.22 Additionally, courts have inter-
20. For a discussion of the implications of the holding in Rumpke, see infra
notes 179-87 and accompanying text.
21. See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1455 (9th Cir.
1986) (stating Congress's purpose in CERCLA "was to ensure the prompt and ef-
fective cleanup of waste disposal sites, and to assure that parties responsible for
hazardous substances bore the cost of remedying the conditions they created");
Adhesives Research Inc. v. American Inks & Coatings Corp., 931 F. Supp. 1231,
1236 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (stating purpose of CERCLA was "to provide for liability,
compensation, cleanup, and emergency response for hazardous substances re-
leased into the environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal
site"); see also Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 n.13 (1994)
("CERCLA is designed to encourage private parties to assume the financial respon-
sibility of cleanup by allowing them to seek recovery from others.") (quoting FMC
Corp. v. Aero Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 842, 847 (10th Cir. 1993)).
Some commentators have suggested that courts have recognized that CER-
CLA was created for the following objectives: (1) to encourage the use of maxi-
mum care and responsibility when handling hazardous substances; and (2) to
encourage the prompt reporting of CERCIA violations. See Brian I. Sopinsky,
Note, Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp. v. Catellus Development Corp.: Broad
Remedial Powers of CERCLA Take No Prisoners, 6 ViLE. ENvTL. L.J. 181, 185 (1995)
(citing Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp.
1285, 1290 (E.D. Pa. 1987)).
CERCLA provides four tactics to achieve its goals: (1) an information-gather-
ing and reporting system; (2) the federal authority to act on hazardous waste emer-
gencies and to clean up inactive dump sites; (3) the establishment of a fund to
finance the cleanup of the inactive sites; and (4) the imposition of strict liability on
persons contributing to the release of hazardous substances. See William H. Rod-
gers, Jr., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA or the Superfund), 4 ENVTL. L. § 8.1.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100,
1112 (D. Minn. 1982). The court in United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp. held
that in order for the congressional goals of CERCLA to be met, "CERCLA should
be given a broad and liberal construction. The statute should not be narrowly
interpreted to frustrate the government's ability to respond promptly and effec-
tively, or to limit the liability of those responsible for cleanup costs beyond the
limits expressly provided." Id. CERCLA is a remedial statute, intended to provide
protection for the public health and the environment. See Dedham Water Co. v.
Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986). Courts are,
therefore, "obligated to construe its provisions liberally to avoid frustration of the
beneficial legislative purposes." Id. (citing United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp.
[Vol. IX: p. 511
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RUMPKE
preted CERCLA as imposing strict liability on those designated as
PRPs. 2 3
Despite these relatively clear goals, courts have recently dis-
agreed over how to characterize a claim brought by a PRP against
another PRP.24 Specifically, two theories of liability have emerged.
First, the cost recovery theory provides that parties may recover
from a PRP all of the costs incurred from the cleanup of a hazard-
ous site. 25 Second, the contribution theory entitles those who have
been found liable to bring suit against other PRPs for their respec-
tive share of the cleanup costs. 26
B. CERCLA's Liability System
1. Cost Recovery Theory
The cost recovery theory is governed by section 107 of CER-
CLA. 27 Section 107(a) specifically describes who may be classified
as a PRP and the manner in which liability attaches.28 Courts have
898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985); United States v. Conservative Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp.
162, 192 (W.D. Mo. 1985)).
23. See CERCLA § 101 (32), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (32) (1994) (defining liability by
same strict liability standard used under section 311 of Clean Water Act); New
Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1120-21 (3d Cir. 1997)
(stating section 107 imposes strict liability on PRPs for costs incurred in hazardous
waste cleanups and site remediation); United States v. Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50
F.3d 1530, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating "it is now well settled that § 107 imposes
strict liability on PRPs" for hazardous waste site cleanups, and "imposes ... liability
on PRPs regardless of fault"); see also H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), at 74 (1985), re-
printed in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2856 (stating "liability under CERCLA is strict,
that is, without regard to fault or willfulness").
24. See generally Hernandez, supra note 8 (discussing controversy among
courts over PRPs' right of recovery and providing alternative solution).
25. For a discussion of the cost recovery theory, see infra notes 27-38 and ac-
companying text.
26. For a discussion of the contribution theory, see infra notes 39-45 and ac-
companying text.
27. See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. For a discussion of constitutional
challenges brought against CERCLA's strict liability scheme, see TOPOL & SNOW,
supra note 1, at §§ 2.1-2.2.
28. See id. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Section 107(a) of CERCLA provides
that:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport
for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or pos-
sessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or
19981
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held that this section also authorizes both the government and pri-
vate plaintiffs to bring actions for cost recovery. 29 Several courts
have interpreted CERCLA as requiring a plaintiff to prove the fol-
lowing four elements to establish a prima facie case for cost recov-
ery:30  (1) that a hazardous substance was disposed of at a
incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of
a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent
with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other per-
son consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury,
destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment of health effects study carried
out [consistent with] this title.
Id. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Additionally, a "person" as used in section 107
of CERCLA includes any individual, corporation, association or partnership. See
id. § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
29. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989)
("Section 9607(a) ... permits both government and private plaintiffs to recover
from responsible parties the costs incurred in cleaning up and responding to haz-
ardous substances. .. ."); Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 890
(9th Cir. 1986) (holding that section 107 "expressly creates a private right of action
for damages"); Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp.
283, 288 (N.D. Cal. 1984) ("It is difficult for the Court to imagine statutory lan-
guage that would more clearly grant a private cause of action."); Hernandez, supra
note 8, at 89-90 (discussing authorization of "the United States, the states, Indian
tribes, and any other person" to bring action for cost recovery).
Under section 107(a) of CERCLA, EPA will seek to recover costs expended
from the Superfund and a private party will seek to recover the costs that it has
incurred for the cleanup of a hazardous site from the PRPs. See CERCLA § 107(a),
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Costs that are recoverable include those costs associated with
short term "removal actions," such as responding to discovered leaks or spills, as
well as those costs associated with long term "remedial actions," such as activities
aimed at providing permanent cleanup and restoring environmental quality. See
ToPoL & SNOW, supra note 1, at 11. The remedial or removal actions taken by the
federal government, state governments and private parties to clean up sites must
be conducted within the guidelines for cleanup established by the National Con-
tingency Plan (NCP). See CERCIA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605. In federal and state
cost recovery actions, the defendant PRP must overcome a presumption that all of
the cleanup costs are consistent with the NCP in order to prevail. See Hernandez,
supra note 8, at 91. In cost recovery actions brought by private parties, the plaintiff
has the burden of proving that its costs are consistent with the NCP. See id.
30. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). For an explanation of how
these four requirements are analyzed by the courts, see In re Reading Co., 115 F.3d
1111, 1117-18 (3d Cir. 1997); Amoco Oil, 889 F.2d at 668; Stearns & Foster Bedding
Co. v. Franklin Holding Corp., 947 F. Supp. 790, 797 (D.N.J. 1996); Laidlaw Waste
Sys., Inc. v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 624, 629 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
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"facility;" 3 1  (2) that there has been an actual "release" or
"threatened release" from that facility; 32 (3) that the defendant is
considered a responsible party under section 107(a);3 3 and (4) that
the release or threatened release has caused the plaintiff to incur
response costs. 3 4 Once a court determines that a party is a PRP,
strict liability attaches and the party may avoid liability only by estab-
lishing one of the defenses listed in section 107(b). 35
31. See CERCLA § 101 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). CERCLA has defined "facil-
ity" as including "any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited,
stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise to be located." Id.
32. See id. § 101 (22), 42 U.S.C. 9601(22). CERCLA has defined "release" as
"any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, inject-
ing, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment .... " Id.
33. For a discussion of CERCLA's definition of a responsible party, see supra
note 28 and accompanying text.
34. See CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B). CERCLA has de-
fined "response costs" as those costs which are consistent with the NCP, as well as
reasonable under the circumstances. See id. Response costs include the costs of
"such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or
threat of release of hazardous substances ....... Id. § 101(23), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601 (23).
35. See id. § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). This section provides:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a per-
son otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and
the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent
of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in con-
nection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly,
with the defendant ... if the defendant establishes that (a) he exer-
cised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned...
in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took pre-
cautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party
and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or
omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
Id. Section 101 (35) (A) of CERCLA provides the following definition of the term
"contractual relationship" used in section 107(b) (3):
The term "contractual relationship," for the purpose of section
9607(b) (3), includes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds or other
instruments transferring title or possession, unless the real property on
which the facility concerned is located was acquired by the defendant
after the disposal or placement of the hazardous substance on, in, or at
the facility, and one or more of the circumstances described in clause (i),
(ii), or (iii) is also established by the defendant by a preponderance of
the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did
not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substances
which is the subject of the release or threatened release was dis-
posed of on, in, or at the facility.
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facility by
escheat, or through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or
1998] RUMPKE
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Courts have interpreted section 107(a) as imposing joint and
several liability on PRPs for all response costs incurred by a party
during the cleanup of a hazardous waste site. 36 When Congress
originally enacted CERCLA, a party's sole remedy for response
through the exercise of eminent domain authority by purchase or
condemnation.
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest. In
addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must establish
that he has satisfied the requirements of section 9607(b) (3) (a) and
(b) of this title.
Id. § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A). The definition of the term "contrac-
tual relationship" was intended to "clarify and confirm that under limited circum-
stances landowners who acquire property without knowing of any contamination
• . . may have a defense to liability under section 107 and therefore should not be
held liable for cleaning up the site if such persons satisfy the remaining require-
ments of section 107(b)(3)." H.R. REP. No. 99-962, at 186 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3299. Sections 107(b) and 101 (35) (A) work together to estab-
lish the innocent landowner defense. See Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v.
Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 1266, 1280 (E.D. Va. 1992). Specifically, the
defense derives from the general third-party defense set forth in section 107(b) (3)
of CERCLA, with the essential term "contractual relationship" being defined in
section 101(35) (A). See id. Commentators have referred to the innocent land-
owner defense as providing "a useful counterbalance to the strict liability scheme
of CERCLA." Eva M. Fromm et al., Allocating Environmental Liabilities in Acquisi-
tions, 22 J. CoRe. L. 429, 455 (1997).
36. See, e.g., Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc. v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 624,
629 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (stating that liability under section 107(a) is joint and several
unless PRP can prove that harm caused is divisible). When Congress originally
enacted CERC[A, it did not expressly mention joint and several liability, and thus,
courts were forced to "establish the scope of liability through a case-by-case applica-
tion of 'traditional and evolving principles of common law' and pre-existing statu-
tory law." H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), at 74 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2835, 2856. The Energy and Commerce Committee reported that the court in
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp. "had established a uniform federal rule for using
joint and several liability in the appropriate CERCLA cases." Id. The court in
Chem-Dyne was the first court to address the application ofjoint and several liability
under CERCLA. See United States v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio
1983). The court stated:
A reading of the entire legislative history in context reveals that the scope
of liability and term joint and several liability were deleted to avoid a
mandatory legislative standard applicable in all situations which might
produce inequitable results in some cases. The deletion was not in-
tended as a rejection of joint and several liability. Rather the term was
omitted in order to have the scope of liability determined under common
law principles, where a court performing a case by case evaluation of the
complex federal scenarios associated with multi-generator waste sites will
assess the propriety of applying joint and several liability on an individual
basis.
Id. at 808. The Chem-Dyne court relied on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433
(1965) to determine whether to impose joint and several liability or to impose
several liability, in which the PRP would only bare its own share of the cost in-
curred. See id. at 810. For the pertinent text of Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 433 (1965), see infra note 38.
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costs was a cost recovery action under section 107(a).37 Courts were
forced to use common law principles to create an implied right of
contribution among PRPs because CERCLA did not yet contain any
cost contribution provision. 38
37. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Originally, there was no ex-
press mechanism for a party to recover the costs incurred in cleaning up a hazard-
ous site which were not part of its pro rata share. SeeIn reReading, 115 F.3d 1111,
1118 (3d Cir. 1997). The courts, therefore, created a remedy by interpreting sec-
tion 107(a) as providing a private right of action for contribution from others
when a party has incurred more than its pro rata share of the expenses. See id.
38. See Richard D. Buckley, Jr., Comment, Making a Case for Statutory Amend-
ment to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA"): Solving the Section 107/Section 113 Cause of Action Controversy, 31 TULSA
L.J. 851, 856 (1996). Courts have generally bifurcated issues of contribution into a
liability phase and a subsequent cost allocation phase. See id. PRPs were held
jointly and severally liable, according to the common law principles of joint
tortfeasors, unless the harm was shown to be divisible. See id. In the early stages of
CERCLA, in order to have a systematic way to allow PRPs to bring actions for con-
tribution, the federal courts relied on the following sections of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts:
§ 886A. Contribution Among Tortfeasors:
(1) Except as stated in Subsections (2), (3) and (4), when two or more
persons become liable in tort to the same person for the same harm,
there is a right of contribution among them, even though judgment
has not been recovered against all or any of them.
(2) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has
discharged the entire claim for the harm by paying more than his
equitable share of the common liability, and is limited to the amount
paid by him in excess of his share. No tortfeasor can be required to
make contribution beyond his own equitable share of the liability.
(3) There is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has
intentionally caused the harm.
(4) When one tortfeasor has a right of indemnity against another,
neither of them has a right to contribution against the other.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1979).
§ 433A. Apportionment of Harm to Causes:
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes
where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of
each cause to a single harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or
more causes.
Id. § 433A (1965).
§ 881. Distinct or Divisible Harms:
If two or more persons, acting independently, tortiously cause distinct
harms or a single harm for which there is a reasonable basis for division
according to the contribution of each, each is subject to liability only for
the portion of the total harm that he has himself caused.
Id. § 881 (1979). For further discussion of how the courts applied these sections of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, see Buckley, supra, at 856-57.
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2. The Contribution Theory
In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA with the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). 39 In doing so, Con-
gress added section 113(f), which both codified the federal com-
mon law principles of contribution as well as provided an express
right to contribution. 40 This provision permits a PRP that has been
held jointly and severally liable under section 107(a) to seek contri-
bution from other PRPs if it incurred a disproportionate share of
the cleanup costs. 4 1 The liability imposed on PRPs in an action for
contribution is several only.4 2
In addition to the express right of contribution, Congress es-
tablished a "contribution bar" in section 113(f) (2). 4 3 This subsec-
39. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1994)) [hereinafter SARA].
40. See Panzer, supra note 3, at 450. Section 113(f) of CERCLA provides:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following
any civil action under ... section 9607(a) of this title. Such claims shall
be brought in accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribu-
tion claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties
using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.
Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring
an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under ... sec-
tion 9607 of this title.
CERCLA § 113(f) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1).
41. See id.; United Tech. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 100
(1st Cir. 1994) (stating purpose of section 113(f) is to "clarif[y] and confirm[ ] the
right of a person held jointly and severally liable under CERCLA to seek contribu-
tion from other potentially liable parties, when the person believes that it has as-
sumed a share of the cleanup or cost that may be greater than its equitable share
under the circumstances"); see also In re Reading, 115 F.3d at 1119; Hemingway
Transport, Inc. v. Kahn, 993 F.2d 915, 922 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding contribution
provision enables PRPs "subjected to pending or completed EPA enforcement ac-
tions" to bring private actions "for full or partial contribution from nonsettling PRPs
by way of impleader or an independent action"); but see Adhesives Research Inc. v.
American Inks & Coatings Corp., 931 F. Supp. 1231, 1237 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (stating
attempt to "clarify and confirm" right to contribution created confusion in inter-
play of sections 107 and 113). For a further discussion of the purposes of section
113(f), see Panzer, supra note 3, at 450-53 (discussing how right of contribution
promotes fairness in apportioning liability).
42. See CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). The PRP suing for contribu-
tion remains liable for all costs that cannot be fairly allocated to the defendants in
the contribution action. See id. Moreover, the PRP who has intentionally created
the hazardous waste situation will be held liable without the right to contribution.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (3) (1979). For the language used in
section 886A(3) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, see supra note 38.
43. See CERCLA § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 113(f)(2). Section 113(f)(2) of
CERCLA provides:
A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an
administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for
12
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tion provides that a party who has resolved its liability in a
settlement agreement with either the United States or a state will
not be liable for further claims for contribution on matters covered
in that settlement. 44 The contribution bar is designed to promote
CERCLA's goals of encouraging prompt and voluntary cleanup of a
hazardous site and imposing the costs of a cleanup on the parties
responsible. 45
C. The Controversy: A PRP's Right to Recovery
With the enactment of SARA, Congress established two express
causes of action for a party that incurs response costs, namely, a cost
recovery action under section 107, and a contribution action under
section 113.46 Cost recovery actions are generally favored by plain-
tiffs because they entitle the plaintiff to recover all costs incurred in
the hazardous site cleanup. 47 Courts, however, have been reluctant
claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement.
Such settlement does not discharge any of the other potentially liable
persons unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the potential liability of
the others by the amount of the settlement.
Id. § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
44. See id.; see also Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 107 F.3d
1235, 1236 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating barring contribution "protects parties who set-
tle claims with the government from liability for contribution in suits relating to
'matters addressed' in administratively or judicially settled consent decrees").
45. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), at 80 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2835, 2862 ("Private parties may be more willing to assume the financial responsi-
bility for some or all of the cleanup if they are assured that they can seek contribu-
tion from others."). Critics have viewed the contribution bar as giving the United
States "obvious and important leverage" for the efficient resolution of waste site
cleanup disputes. In re Reading, 115 F.3d at 1119. Non-settling PRPs remain liable
for the total amount minus the settlement agreement. See id. PRPs who choose to
settle, therefore, "gain protection from contribution, enjoy potentially favorable
settlement terms, and retain the ability to seek contribution from other defend-
ants." Id. Conversely, PRPs who do not settle, "are barred from seeking contribu-
tion from the settling PRPs and thus face potentially disproportionate liability." Id.
46. See United Tech., 33 F.3d at 99 (stating that CERCLA distinguishes between
actions for cost recovery and actions for contribution); Kaufman & Broad-South
Bay v. Unisys Corp., 868 F. Supp. 1212, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (stating that CER-
CLA provides "two different kinds of legal actions" for parties to recover some or
all of costs incurred in cleanup).
The First Circuit in United Technologies noted that although Congress did not
explicitly state when to use each type of action, "we are not wholly without gui-
dance." United Tech., 33 F.3d at 99. The First Circuit emphasized the need to util-
ize the accepted cannons of construction and to construe the meaning of the legal
terms contained in the statute in accordance with their customary legal meaning.
See id.
47. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Plaintiffs prefer actions for
cost recovery for two additional reasons: (1) there is a longer statute of limitations
in which an action may be brought and (2) cost recovery actions may be brought
against PRPs who are protected against actions for cost contribution by the contri-
bution bar under section 113(f) (2). See Panzer, supra note 3, at 456-57. One of the
1998]
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to allow a PRP to sue other PRPs to recover all cleanup costs
incurred. 48
There has been no Supreme Court decision that has specifi-
cally addressed whether a plaintiff PRP may bring an action under
section 107(a). The Supreme Court did, however, state in Key
Tronic Corp. v. United States49 that CERCLA "authorizes a cause of
action for contribution in section 113 and impliedly authorizes a
similar somewhat overlapping remedy in section 107."50 While
most courts find this language to be irrelevant, some courts have
used it as support for holding that a PRP may bring an action for
cost recovery under section 107 of CERCLA.51 Because the
Supreme Court has not expressly addressed this issue, an analysis of
the applicable case law will demonstrate the divided views which
major disadvantages of pursuing an action for contribution is that the plaintiff may
not be able to recover all of its losses unless that party is able to bring an action for
contribution against all of the liable parties. See id. at 451.
Claims by PRPs generally arise in one of two ways. See Hernandez, supra note
8, at 83. First, EPA, or a similar entity, may clean up a site and then bring a cost
recovery action against a PRP. See id. at 84. Since, according to the cost recovery
provision, that party will be considered jointly and severally liable, it will then want
to sue other PRPs to force them to share in the liability. See id. Second, a PRP may
either voluntarily clean up a site or be compelled to do so by the government. See
id. The PRP in this situation may also want to sue other PRPs to share the costs of
the cleanup. See id.
48. See Baicker-McKee & Singer, supra note 11 ("Congress did not indicate
whether [section 113(f)] was meant to supplement private parties' efforts to re-
cover response costs from other potentially responsible parties under CERCLA
§ 107 or was meant to preclude such cost recovery actions."). For discussion of
courts' reasons for limiting PRPs to actions for contribution, see infra notes 153-55
and accompanying text.
49. 511 U.S. 809 (1994).
50. Id. at 816. In Key Tronic, the Court faced the issue of whether attorneys'
fees could be considered necessary response costs under CERCLA. See id. at 811.
The petitioner settled the lawsuit brought against it by EPA and then brought an
action against other PRPs to recover a share of its cleanup costs. See id. at 811-12.
Although the Court held that the attorneys' fees were not recoverable under sec-
tion 107, however, it noted that:
[This holding] does not signify that all payments that happen to be made
by a lawyer are unrecoverable expenses under CERCLA. On the con-
trary, some lawyers' work that is closely tied to the actual cleanup may
constitute a necessary cost of response in and of itself under the terms of
§ 107(a) (4) (B).
Id. at 819-20. For the pertinent text of section 107(a) (4) (B), see supra note 28.
51. Compare Adhesives Research Inc. v. American Inks & Coatings Corp., 931
F. Supp. 1231, 1246 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (noting that Key Tronic "seems to implicitly
endorse the validity of a PRP cost recovery action") with Steams & Foster Bedding
Co. v. Franklin Holding Corp., 947 F. Supp. 790, 799 (D.N.J. 1996) (stating Key
Tronic Court did not intend to address PRPs' right of action under section 107).
14
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courts have established with respect to whether a PRP may bring an
action for cost recovery against other PRPs. 52
1. How the Circuit Courts Have Addressed the Controversy
The Fifth Circuit in Amoco Oil v. Borden Inc. 53 was one of the
first circuit courts to address the issue of whether a PRP may bring
an action under section 107(a) of CERCLA. 54 In Amoco Oil, the
Fifth Circuit held that a PRP's remedy is limited to contribution. 55
The Fifth Circuit noted that it is the court's responsibility to ascer-
tain each responsible party's equitable share of the cleanup costs
under CERCLA's contribution provision.56
The Sixth Circuit, however, held in Velsicol Chemical Corp. v.
Enenco, Inc. 57 that a plaintiff PRP could bring an action under sec-
tion 107(a). 58 In Velsicol Chemical, the plaintiff brought an action
under section 107(a), alleging that the defendant was also responsi-
ble for the contamination of a site that the plaintiff had been or-
dered to clean up.59 The Sixth Circuit, finding that the defendant
failed to establish one of the defenses to liability enumerated under
52. See generally Stach, supra note 8, at 48-78 (providing synopsis of each case
decided during 1994 and 1995 that addressed whether PRPs may bring actions for
cost recovery against other PRPs).
53. 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989).
54. See id. In Amoco Oil Amoco Oil Company (Amoco) had purchased prop-
erty from Borden in 1977. See id. at 666. In 1978, the Texas Department of Water
Resources informed Amoco for the first time of the radioactive nature of phospho-
gypsum. See id. Amoco was aware this substance was on the site, but was not aware
that it was a hazardous waste. See id.
55. See id. at 672. The Fifth Circuit stated that as the "owner of a facility that
continues to release a hazardous substance, Amoco shares joint and several liability
for remedial actions with [other PRPs]." Id.; see also Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Sara-
land Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding plaintiff PRP, as
original owner of contaminated site, may only bring claim for contribution).
56. See Amoco Oil, 889 F.2d at 668.
57. 9 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 1993).
58. See id. at 530. In Velsicol Chemical EPA performed studies which indicated
the presence of hazardous materials in the sediment and table water of the North
Hollywood Dump. See id. at 526. Velsicol Chemical Corporation (Velsicol) was
one of the entities that used this site to dispose of waste. See id. EPA, therefore,
concluded that Velsicol may be responsible for at least some of the contamination.
See id. Despite any role that Velsicol may have played in the contamination of the
site, the Sixth Circuit held that Velsicol, a PRP, may bring a cost recovery action
under section 107(a) against the other PRPs. See id. at 530.
59. See id. at 527. Velsicol filed a third party complaint against the defendants
for cost recovery and, in the alternative, for cost contribution. See id. Velsicol al-
leged that the defendants had disposed of its wastes containing hazardous sub-
stances at the dump site, and therefore, was also a PRP for the contamination of
the dump site. See id.
1998] RUMPKE
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section 107(b), held that the plaintiff was entitled to bring an ac-
tion for response cost recovery. 60
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Akzo Coatings, Inc., v. Aligner
Corp.61 initiated a trend of limiting PRPs to actions for contribu-
tion.62 In Akzo, the plaintiff, as well as twenty other companies, re-
ceived an administrative order to conduct emergency removal
activities at a facility.63 The plaintiff, in an effort to recoup the costs
it had incurred in the cleanup, argued that it was entitled to bring a
cost recovery action under section 107(a). 64 Although the Seventh
60. See id. at 530. The Sixth Circuit found that the district court had erred by
holding that the doctrine of laches, the defense asserted by the defendants, barred
Velsicol's suit. See id. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that other courts had al-
lowed non-enumerated equitable defenses to be applied in CERCLA litigation. See
id. The Sixth Circuit explained, however, that "[t]he clear language of section
107(a) and (b) ... manifests the congressional intent to foreclose any non-enu-
merated defenses to liability." Id. The Sixth Circuit noted that the Eighth Circuit
had also recognized that "the plain language of 107(b) ... set[s] forth the universe
of defenses to section 107 liability." Id. (citing General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus.
Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1418 (8th Cir. 1990)). Since the defendant
had no valid defense, the Sixth Circuit held that Velsicol was entitled to bring a
claim under section 107(a). See id. For further discussion of the Sixth Circuit's
reasoning in Velsicol Chemical, see infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
61. 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994).
62. See Buckley, supra note 38, at 865-74. Currently, there is a trend among
the courts to prohibit PRPs from bringing an action under section 107(a) of CER-
CIA. See id. at 865-68. Interestingly, some commentators argue that Congress
should repeal section 113 in order to restore the original intent of CERCLA. See
id. at 868-74.
63. See Akzo, 30 F.3d at 762. In Akzo, more than 200 firms had sent the hazard-
ous wastes generated from their respective sites to the Fisher-Calo site, a collective
group of facilities which included the Two-Line Road facility. See id. In 1988, EPA
found that the wastes stored at the Two-Line Road facility created a "danger of
release" into the surrounding environment. Id. EPA issued an order requiring
Akzo Coatings (Akzo), and over twenty other companies that were considered lia-
ble parties under CERCLA, to complete the following tasks: (1) fence off and
otherwise secure the facility; (2) secure and remove all drums, tanks and other
containers of hazardous waste from the premises, including buried containers; and
(3) determine the extent to which the soil was contaminated and remove any soil
that was visibly polluted. See id. Akzo, acting in full compliance with the orders,
incurred costs in excess of $1.2 million. See id. at 762-63.
64. See id. at 763-64. In 1990, approximately thirty-five companies that had
been labeled PRPs with respect to the Fisher-Calo site, including Akzo, began per-
forming voluntary evaluations. See id. at 763. The purpose of these evaluations was
"to quantify the nature and extent of the liability of any and all PRPs for clean-up
of the site and to evaluate" the type of work that was going to be ordered. Id. Less
than a year later, Akzo withdrew from these evaluations, claiming that it was not
liable for any contamination of the Fisher-Calo site beyond the Two-Line Road
facility. See id. In 1992, several PRPs, including Aigner Corporation, entered into a
consent decree with EPA to complete the decontamination of the site and to com-
pensate EPA for some of the expenses it had incurred to date. See id. Soon after,
Akzo brought suit against Aigner Corporation for full compensation of the ex-
penses of the initial cleanup work that was required by EPA, as well as the volun-
tary costs Akzo had incurred due to studying the site for long-term effects. See id.
16
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Circuit disagreed, it noted that the plaintiff could have brought a
cost recovery action if the plaintiff had not actively contaminated
the site, and thereby created what courts in later cases have called
the "innocent landowner exception."65 Nevertheless, the Seventh
Circuit in Akzo found that the "innocent landowner exception" did
not apply in this case and held that the plaintiff could only pursue
an action for cost contribution under section 113(f) of CERCLA. 66
In United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Industries,67 the
First Circuit followed the Seventh Circuit's reasoning by limiting a
PRP that was liable under a consent decree to an action for contri-
bution.68 In United Technologies, the plaintiff admitted its liability for
the contamination of the site, entered into a consent decree and
incurred significant costs in the required cleanup work.69 The
plaintiff then brought suit against several defendants, alleging that
the defendants were "wholly or partially responsible" for the con-
tamination. 70 The First Circuit, noting the plaintiff's confessed lia-
bility, rejected the possibility of a cost recovery claim and stated that
65. Id. at 764. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that "[w]hatever label Akzo may
wish to use, its claim remains one by and between jointly and severally liable parties
for an appropriate division of the payment one of them has been compelled to
make." Id. The Seventh Circuit, thus, concluded that Akzo's claim was "governed
by section 113(f)." Id.
66. See id. at 764. The Seventh Circuit stated that "Akzo itself is a party liable
in some measure for the contamination at the... site, and the gist of Akzo's claim
is that the costs it has incurred should be apportioned equitably amongst itself and
the others responsible .... That is a quintessential claim for contribution." Id.
(citation omitted). Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit created what has been re-
ferred to as the "innocent landowner exception" by stating: "Akzo has experienced
no injury of the kind that would typically give rise to a direct claim under section
107(a)-it is not, for example, a landowner forced to clean up hazardous materials
that a third party spilled onto its property or that migrated there from adjacent
lands." Id. For a critical analysis of the Seventh Circuit's application of the "inno-
cent landowner exception," see infra notes 148-64 and accompanying text.
67. 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1994).
68. See id. at 102. In United Technologies, EPA placed the site in question on the
NPL in 1981. See id. at 97. Subsequently, EPA conducted an investigation and
discovered that Inmont Corporation, later acquired by the plaintiff, United Tech-
nologies Corporation (UTC), had engaged in various activities that led to the con-
tamination of the site. See id. In 1986, the United States brought a civil action
against several parties, including UTC, for past and current cleanup costs incurred
by the federal government as well as future cleanup costs that would continue to
be incurred. See id.
69. See id. According to the decree, UTC agreed to "undertake and complete
corrective work" at the site, in addition to reimbursing the state and federal gov-
ernments for the costs already incurred. Id. UTC alleged it had already spent in
excess of $13 million and predicted that the additional work still required would
run in excess of $20 million. See id.
70. Id. UTC initially sought three separate kinds of relief: (1) recovery of
cleanup costs paid directly by them; (2) recovery of the costs paid by them to
reimburse EPA; and (3) a declaration of rights with respect to liability for future
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"it is sensible to assume that Congress intended only innocent par-
ties - not parties who were themselves liable - to be permitted to
recoup the whole of their expenditures." 71
The Tenth Circuit faced a similar situation in United States v.
Colorado & Eastern Railroad Co. 72 In Colorado & Eastern Railroad Co.,
the United States filed suit against all known PRPs, including the
defendant, who was the current owner of the site, and the plaintiff,
who was a previous owner of the site. 73 The plaintiff then brought
an action against the defendant for cost recovery under section
107(a).74 The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff's claim could
proceed as an action for contribution. 75 The Tenth Circuit rea-
response costs. See id. at 97-98. UTC later voluntarily dropped its claim for reim-
bursement of the costs paid to EPA. See id. at 98.
71. Id. at 100. In making its decision the First Circuit stated:
By contrast, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g) (3) allows a "non-innocent" party (i.e., a
party who himself is liable) only to seek recoupment of that portion of his
expenditures which exceeds his pro rata share of the overall liability-in
other words to seek contribution rather than complete indemnity. The
statutory language thus suggests that cost recovery and contribution ac-
tions are distinct and do not overlap.
Id. (citing CERCIA § .113(g) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g) (3) (1994)). The First Circuit
also found support for its decision by relying on the definition of contribution as a
claim "'by and between jointly and severally liable parties for an appropriate divi-
sion of the payment one of them has been compelled to make.'" Id. at 99 (quoting
Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Alinger Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994)).
72. 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995).
73. See id. at 1533. In 1968, Farmland purchased a controlling interest in
Woodbury Chemical Company (Woodbury), which was located on land that had
been contaminated since 1965. See id. at 1532. Farmland then sold its interest to
another party in 1971 and in 1983 the site was added to the NPL. See id. In 1984,
Colorado & Eastern Railroad Co. (CERC) purchased this site. See id. at 1533. In
1989, EPA filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado
under section 107 of CERCLA against the past and present owners of the site. See
id.
Farmland entered into a consent decree with the United States in 1990, in
which it agreed to finance and perform all remediation of the site and to reim-
burse $700,000 to EPA for the past response costs. See id. The agreed upon
cleanup work was completed at a cost in excess of $15 million, of which Farmland
alleged nearly $1.5 million was incurred due to CERC's activities on the site. See id.
CERC entered into its own consent decree with the United States in April, 1992,
two months before the remediation of the site was complete, and it agreed to pay
$100,000 of EPA's past response costs. See id.
74. See id. In addition to the cost recovery claim, Farmland also pled in the
alternative for contribution under section 113(f) of CERCLA. See id. Before Farm-
land could successfully bring either action, the Eleventh Circuit had to assess the
scope of the consent decree that CERC had entered. See id. at 1539. The Eleventh
Circuit held CERC was "protected from any contribution claim Farmland may
make in regard to its $700,000 payment to the government but not from Farm-
land's . .. claim for contribution involving remediation costs allegedly caused by
[CERC]." Id.
75. See id. at 1536. The Tenth Circuit explained that the contribution provi-
sion describes the discretion the courts have in carrying out a contribution claim.
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soned that "[t] here is no disagreement that both parties are PRPs
by virtue of their past or present ownership of the site; therefore,
any claim that would reapportion costs between these parties is the
quintessential claim for contribution. '76
In two recent circuit court cases addressing the issue of a PRP
bringing an action for cost recovery, the Third Circuit in New Castle
County v. Halliburton NUS Corp.77 and the Ninth Circuit in Pinal
Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp.78 reached very similar holdings.
In New Castle County, the owner and operator of a contaminated
landfill filed suit, claiming the defendant was responsible for all or
part of the costs incurred for the cleanup of the site. 79 In Pinal
Creek Group, the plaintiff, after admitting its own liability, also com-
menced an action in an attempt to recover from the other PRPs all,
or part, of the expenses incurred in the voluntary cleanup of the
site.80 Both the Third and Ninth Circuits held that the plaintiffs
See id. "[T]he court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such
equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate." Id. (citing CERCLA
§ 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (1994)). The Tenth Circuit noted that it may
use any number of determining factors, depending on the circumstances of the
particular case, to establish the amount of contribution due from the liable parties.
See id. (citing Environmental Transp. Sys., Inc. v. ENSCO, Inc., 969 F.2d 503, 509
(7th Cir. 1992)). Additionally, the Tenth Circuit emphasized that "'the burden of
proof is on the ...party seeking apportionment to establish that it should be
granted.'" Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-253(111), at 19 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 3038, 3042).
76. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1979)). The Tenth
Circuit added that if PRPs were allowed to recover costs incurred in "cleanup and
remediation from other PRPs under § 107's strict liability scheme, § 113(f) would
be rendered meaningless." Id.
77. 111 F.3d 1116 (3d Cir. 1997).
78. 118 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1997).
79. See New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1119. After hazardous substances had
been discovered at the landfill owned by New Castle County, the United States
filed suit against New Castle County and other PRPs, who collectively became
known as New Castle. See id. EPA then entered into a series of consent decrees
with New Castle, requiring it "to finance and implement remedial action at the
landfill." Id. EPA contracted with Halliburton NUS Corporation (NUS) to per-
form a "Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study" so that the appropriate response
actions could be determined. Id. New Castle alleged that NUS installed one of the
monitoring wells improperly which "opened a 'window' between the two ground-
water formations." Id. New Castle, therefore, filed a suit for cost recovery claiming
that NUS was liable under section 107(a) (4) (B) of CERCLA for all or part of the
costs incurred for the cleanup of the site. See id.
80. See Pinal Creek Group, 118 F.3d at 1300. Three mining companies, collec-
tively known as the Pinal Group, voluntarily undertook the cleanup of the Pinal
Creek Drainage Basin, a hazardous waste site. See id. The Pinal Group admitted
that it was at least partially liable for some of the cleanup costs. See id. Despite
admitting to partial liability, the Pinal Group asserted a claim for the "totality" of
the costs and sought to impose joint and several liability on the defendants. See id.
The Pinal Group contended that it should be allowed to bring suit under section
107(a) of CERCLA because the defendants would subsequently be entitled to
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could not bring actions for cost recovery and noted that sections
107 and 113 work together to "provide" and "regulate" a PRP's
right to contribution. 81
The Seventh Circuit, however, in AM International, Inc. v. Data-
card Corp.,82 broke the trend of limiting PRPs to actions for contri-
bution.83 In AM International, despite knowledge that the site was
contaminated, the plaintiff purchased an industrial site assuming
that it would be able to recover any cleanup expenses from the for-
mer owner.84 The Seventh Circuit held that because the plaintiff
was a PRP "merely due to its status as a landowner," it was entitled
to bring a cost recovery action under section 107(a) (4) (B) of
CERCLA.85
bring an action for contribution against the Pinal Group to recover costs for which
Pinal Group was responsible. See id.
81. See Pinal Creek Group, 118 F.3d at 1301-02; New Castle County, 111 F.3d at
1122. For a discussion of the reasoning used by the Ninth Circuit in Pinal Creek
Group and the Third Circuit in New Castle County, see infra note 155.
82. 106 F.3d 1342 (7th Cir. 1997).
83. See id. The Seventh Circuit in AM International rejected the defendant's
argument that only parties, who did not cause the contamination, could bring an
action under section 107(a) and allowed the plaintiff PRP to bring such an action.
See id. at 1346-47.
84. See id. at 1346. AM International (AMI) owned an industrial site from
1959 to 1981, on which a "tank farm" was operated. See id. at 1345. AMI had
mixed chemicals at the site to form cleaning products and, in doing so, spilled
thousands of gallons of these chemicals on the ground. See id. In 1981, AMI sold
the site to DBS, Inc., but retained ownership of the tanks and leased the tank farm
grounds back from DBS, Inc. See id. While leasing the tank farm grounds, AMI
continued to spill more chemicals onto the ground, until 1985, when AMI finally
ended the tank farm operations. See id. at 1346. Datacard Corporation, a year
later, conducted an environmental audit of the site, and despite the discovery of
the contamination, bought the site from DBS, Inc. See id. Datacard Corporation
then immediately undertook the cleanup of the site and gave AMI, among other
parties, notice that it intended to sue for the response costs of the cleanup. See id.
Upon receiving the notice, AMI sought ajudgment claiming that Datacard's claim
had been discharged due to AMI's status of being bankrupt. See id. Datacard Cor-
poration then filed counterclaims against AMI, requesting damages under CER-
CLA. See id.
85. Id. at 1347. The Seventh Circuit, relying on its previous holding in Akzo,
held that, ordinarily, cost recovery disputes between two PRPs are considered
claims for contribution. See id. The Seventh Circuit noted, however, that the deci-
sion in Akzo established that "if a landowner faces liability solely because a third
party spilled or allowed hazardous waste to migrate onto its property, the land-
owner may directly sue for its response costs." Id. (citing Akzo Coatings, Inc. v.
Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994)). The Seventh Circuit in AM Inter-
national noted that since Datacard Corporation did not participate in the manufac-
turing of the chemicals that were spilled, it was in the position of a "party forced to
clean up contamination on its property due to a third party's spill." Id. Applying
the language used in Akzo, the Seventh Circuit held that Datacard Corporation
was, therefore, entitled to bring an action for cost recovery under section
107(a) (4) (B). See id. The Seventh Circuit in AM International did not discuss
whether the plaintiff PRP (a "less innocent landowner") was required to meet the
20
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2. How District Courts Have Addressed the Controversy
In addition to those circuit courts that have addressed the is-
sue, some district courts have also had to decide whether a PRP may
bring an action for cost recovery. In Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v.
Lewis Industries, Inc.,86 for example, the court held that the plaintiff
PRPs were entitled to bring an action for cost recovery under sec-
tion 107 (a) against the other PRPs.87 In so holding, the court fo-
cused on the case law surrounding the issue, the language of
section 107 and policy considerations.88
elements of the innocent landowner defense under section 107(b) (3) of CERCLA.
See New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1123 n.7 (3d Cir.
1997) (commenting on how Seventh Circuit in AM International included only
brief discussion of section 107 and omitted any discussion of innocent landowner
defense of section 107(b) (3)).
86. 891 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
87. See id. at 223. In Bethlehem Iron Works, Bethlehem Fabricators purchased
the site in question in 1968 and shortly thereafter constructed and operated a
structural steel fabricating plant on the property. See id. at 222. Bethlehem
Fabricators sold the property in 1983 to Mr. Charles P. Lewis, the sole stockholder
of Lewis Industries. See id. As the owner of the property, Mr. Lewis also owned and
operated the structural steel fabrication facility. See id. Beginning in 1985, the
plaintiff, Bethlehem Iron Works, took over ownership and continued to operate
the facility. See id.
As the current owner, Bethlehem Iron Works voluntarily cleaned up the site
once the contamination was discovered. See id. Bethlehem Iron Works alleged
that it incurred almost $3 million in cleanup costs. See id. Bethlehem Iron Works
brought suit under section 107(a) of CERCLA to recover these costs from the pre-
vious owners of the site. See id. None of the parties, as far as the evidence on
record indicated, were ever subject to any judgment, consent decree or other
agreement with the state or federal government pertaining to the liability for the
cleanup of this site. See id. The court recognized that as current owners of the
hazardous waste site, Bethlehem Iron Works was a liable party. See id. at 223. In
making its decision, the court rejected any argument that a liable party is not enti-
tled to bring an action for cost recovery under section 107(a) and allowed Bethle-
hem Iron Works to pursue its section 107(a) claims. See id.
88. See id. at 223-25. In analyzing the relevant case law, the Bethlehem Iron
Works court found support in United Technologies, where contribution was defined as
a claim "'by jointly and severally liable parties for an appropriate division of the
payment one of them has been compelled to make.'" Id. at 224 (quoting United
Tech. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 99 (1st Cir. 1994)). The
court in Bethlehem Iron Works distinguished the plaintiffs' voluntary cleanup of the
site in Bethlehem Iron Works from those cases where EPA or another government
entity forced the party to clean up the site. See id. The court additionally empha-
sized a footnote in the First Circuit's decision in United Technologies stating that it
may be possible that "'a PRP who spontaneously initiates a cleanup without gov-
ernmental prodding might be able to pursue an implied right of action for contri-
bution under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)."' Id. (quoting United Tech., 33 F.3d at 99 n.8).
The court summarized, therefore, "that if a plaintiff remediates a site with no gov-
ernmental prodding, it is not prohibited from raising a section 107 claim." Id.
The court in Bethlehem Iron Works also found support in Reichhold Chemicals, Inc.
v. Textron, Inc. See id. In Reichhold Chemicals, the court, in deciding which type of
recovery a plaintiff that had signed a consent decree may pursue, held that "the
exclusive remedy for a liable PRP seeking contribution from other PRPs is a Sec-
19981
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The court's holding in Bethlehem Iron Works can be contrasted
with the court's holding in Kaufman & Broad-South Bay v. Unisys
Corp.89 In Kaufman, the plaintiff was the current owner of a residen-
tial development on which buried barrels of toxic waste were
found.90 The plaintiff filed an action to recover at least part of the
cleanup costs it incurred, claiming that private PRPs were entitled
to bring suit under section 107(a). 91 The court rejected this argu-
ment and held that the only way the plaintiff, a PRP itself, could
bring a section 107 action against other PRPs was if it could prove it
was "innocent" under section 107(b). 92
Similarly, in Stearns & Foster Bedding Co. v. Franklin Holding
Corp.,9 3 the court found that the plaintiff, as the current owner of
the site, was "at the very least a potentially responsible party under
tion 113(f) contribution claim." Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 888 F.
Supp. 1116 (N.D. Fla. 1995). The court in Bethlehem Iron Works stated "[t]he use of
the term 'liable PRP' [by the court in Reichhold Chemicals] instead of just 'PRP'
suggests that the fact that the plaintiff had already entered into a consent decree
with a state agency influenced the court's decision." Bethlehem Iron Works, 891 F.
Supp. at 224.
The court in Bethlehem Iron Works also used an analysis of the statute of limita-
tions for both the cost recovery action and the contribution action to conclude
that PRPs may bring actions under section 107(a). See id. at 225. In an action for
contribution, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date of judgment,
administrative order or entry of a judicially approved settlement concerning costs
or damages. See id. (citing CERCLA § l13(g) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 96 13(g)( 3 ) (1994)).
The court compared this to a claim to recover removal costs, where the statute of
limitations begins to run after the completion of removal, and a claim to recover
remedial costs, where the statute of limitations begins to run after initiation of
physical on-site construction. See id. (citing CERCLA § 113(g) (2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(g) (2)). Based on this comparison, the court found this to be further sup-
port that section 107(a) of CERCLA is available to PRPs, reasoning that "[i]f par-
ties that voluntarily cleanup are permitted to raise claims only pursuant to section
113(f), it seems strange that no statute of limitations applies to these parties." Id.
For a discussion of the analysis of the language of section 107(a) and the policy
arguments, see infra note 152 and accompanying text.
89. 868 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
90. See id. at 1214. Kaufman and Broad-South Bay (K & B) purchased the
property at issue for residential development in 1989. See id. Prior to purchasing
the land, K & B had discovered barrels of toxic waste buried on the property. See
id. Soon after their purchase of the property, the California Regional Water Qual-
ity Control Board issued an abatement order to K & B, "requiring investigation
and remediation of the property, and protection of water under and around the
property." Id.
91. See id. K & B alleged that it spent in excess of $26 million to clean up the
property. See id. K & B brought an action against Unisys Corporation, who was the
successor-in-interest to the alleged originator of the waste, Doudell Trucking Com-
pany and Diamond Tank and Transportation, who allegedly transported the waste
to the site. See id.
92. See id. at 1216. For a discussion of the court's reasoning, see infra notes
168-70 and accompanying text.
93. 947 F. Supp. 790 (D.N.J. 1996).
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CERCLA."9 4 The plaintiff argued that it was not responsible for the
hazardous wastes found at the site.95 The court, nonetheless, held
that unless the plaintiff could prove that it was not liable through
the use of the defenses provided in section 107(b), it would not be
permitted to bring a cost recovery action under section 107(a) due
to their current status as owners. 9 6
III. FACTS
In 1984, Rumpke purchased the Uniontown Landfill, the site
at issue in Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co.9 7 Without
conducting any environmental inspections of its own, Rumpke was
informed by the previous owners that there had never been any
hazardous wastes accepted at the site. 98 In 1990, Rumpke discov-
94. Id. at 798 n.3. Prior to the plaintiffs, Steams & Foster's, purchase of the
site in question, the site had been used primarily for the manufacturing of fire
extinguishers by two separate companies. See id. at 795. Steams & Foster used the
site to manufacture bedding from 1979 until 1991. See id. In June of 1989, Stearns
& Foster entered into an Administrative Consent Order with the New Jersey De-
partment of Environmental Protection. See id. at 795-96. The order required
Stearns & Foster to investigate and determine the amount and the extent of the
soil and groundwater contamination that was currently at the site and to imple-
ment remedial procedures. See id. at 796.
95. See id. at 796. While investigating the contamination, Stearns & Foster
learned that some of the soil and extensive groundwater pollution was caused by
chlorinated solvents. See id. Steams & Foster argued that these types of solvents
were never used in its manufacturing process. See id. It was undisputed, however,
that the companies manufacturing fire extinguishers did use these chlorinated sol-
vents. See id. Additionally, it was undisputed that an employee of one of the fire
extinguisher manufacturers emptied drums of the solvents directly onto the
ground at the site. See id.
96. See id. at 801. For a discussion of the court's reasoning, see infra notes
172-75 and accompanying text.
97. See Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 107 F.3d 1235, 1236
(7th Cir. 1997). The Uniontown site was a sanitary landfill that was in operation
since 1968. See Site Inspection Report for Darlarge Landfill (Rumpke of Indiana)
at 1-2, Rumpke (No. 96-1650). The site covers approximately 274 acres of land and
it has been estimated that nearly 45 acres "have been actively landfilled." See id.
After the land was sold to Rumpke in 1984, Rumpke used it for commercial and
residential trash disposal. See id. No hazardous wastes have been deposited into
the site since the time of Rumpke's purchase. See id.
98. See Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1236. The previous landowners were George and
Ethel Darlage. See id. Rumpke obtained the following warranty as a part of the
purchase of the Uniontown Landfill:
I, George A. Darlage, represent that to the best of my knowledge, no
hazardous waste has been deposited in the landfill I am selling to
Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. All materials have had proper disposal permits
and there are not outstanding EPA citations for hazardous waste viola-
tions. This representation runs with the land and shall survive the closing
of the sell [sic] of the landfill. Dated this 31st day of October 1984.
Brief for Appellee at 3, Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v. Cummings Engine Co., 107
F.3d 1235 (7th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-1650).
1998]
23
McGuire: Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co.: The Potentially Re
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
534 VIIANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL [Vol. IX: p. 511
ered that there had in fact been hazardous wastes deposited at the
Uniontown site for many years.9 9 Rumpke also learned that much
of this waste had come from the Seymour Recycling Corporation,
located about ten miles from the Uniontown site. 100
The Seymour site had been identified as an "environmental
disaster area" before the contamination of the Uniontown site was
discovered. 1 1 In response to the condition of the Seymour site, the
United States filed a complaint, which alleged violations under sec-
tions 106 and 107 of CERCLA. 10 2 A proposed consent decree was
also filed, and the settling parties, which included the Cummins
group, were resolved of all obligations and responsibilities with re-
spect to the Seymour site.103
99. See Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1236. Rumpke claimed to be very surprised by the
"cocktail of hazardous wastes" that were discovered at the Uniontown site and the
[volatile organic compounds] that were found "migrating to surrounding areas."
Id.
100. See id. Rumpke learned that during the time that the Darlages owned
the property "it is possible that wastes were accepted from ... Seymour Manufac-
turing. Such substances as paint pigments, slag, and hardened polymers could
have been accepted for disposal from Seymour." Site Inspection Report for
Darlarge Landfill (Rumpke of Indiana) at 1, Rumpke (No. 96-1650). As a part of
the recycling business, Seymour distilled for reuse acetones, alcohols, paint thin-
ners, chlorinated solvents and freon materials. See Rumphe, 107 F.3d at 1236-37.
The distilling process resulted in both reusable solvents and toxic sludge, and
Rumpke asserted that some of the drums that Seymour used to dispose of the toxic
sludge "made their way" to the Uniontown site. See id. at 1237.
101. See id. Over 60 thousand drums of toxic waste and 98 bulk storage tanks
had been left on the Seymour site in various stages of decay. See id. The drums
and tanks were "leaking, exploding and sending clouds of toxic chemicals into the
air over nearby residential areas." Id.
102. See id. at 1237. The United States filed its original complaint in May of
1980, alleging violations of RCRA and the Clean Water Act. See id. The United
States then filed an amended complaint in 1982, after the enactment of CERCLA,
to include violations of sections 106 and 107 of the newly enacted statute. See id.
The amended complaint added 24 new defendants who "allegedly had transported
hazardous wastes to the Seymour site for handling, storage, disposal or treatment."
Id.
103. See id. The consent decree provided that the United States, the State and
the local governments would not bring any further civil actions against the settling
companies for actions "arising out of or related to the storage, treatment, han-
dling, disposal, transportation or presence or actual or threatened release or dis-
charge of any materials at, to, from or near the Seymour site, including any action
with respect to surface cleanup and soil or groundwater cleanup at the Seymour
site." Id. The consent decree provided a "mechanism by which the surface
cleanup of the Seymour Recycling Site may promptly occur." United States v. Sey-
mour Recycling Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1334, 1336 (S.D. Ind. 1982). According to the
consent decree, each of the 24 settling companies were to pay to the Seymour Site
Trust Fund their specified share of the cleanup costs within 15 days of the entry of
the consent decree. See id. The Trustees of the Fund were then obligated to pay
Chemical Waste Management, a firm specializing in hazardous waste removal, the
money necessary for the cleanup work required at the site. See id. The court ap-
proved the proposed consent decree on the grounds that it was "in accordance
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Rumpke filed suit to recover costs associated with the cleanup
of the Uniontown site against several of the Seymour settling par-
ties, including the Cummins group. 10 4 Rumpke did not act as the
subject of any administrative order from any public authority;
rather, it cleaned up the Uniontown site on a strictly voluntary ba-
sis. 10 5 The Cummins group filed for summary judgment, arguing
that Rumpke was prohibited from bringing a claim for contribution
against them because, according to section 113(f) (2), the consent
decree blocked any action for contribution of costs brought against
a settling party. 106
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana held that the language of the consent decree indicated that
the agreement dealt only with the Seymour site, and thus, the court
with the public interest.... [and] satisfie [d] the requirements of legality, fairness
and reasonableness." Id. at 1342. The court, concerned that a delay in the
cleanup would "exacerbate the potential for groundwater contamination from the
leakage and spillage of chemicals and other substances onto the surface of the
site," emphasized the need to begin the cleanup immediately and abate the haz-
ardous conditions. Id. at 1340. Experts estimated that the cleanup would take
approximately one year to complete. See id. at 1336.
104. See Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1237. At the time Rumpke filed suit, Seymour
Recycling was no longer in existence, so Rumpke filed an action against the manu-
facturers that used Seymour Recycling to process their materials. See id.
105. See id. at 1239. The Seventh Circuit found that it was undisputed that
Rumpke had never been a party subject to any action under CERCLA. See id.
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit assumed that Rumpke did nothing to "contribute to
the presence-of the hazardous substances." Id. Rumpke asserted that it "intends to
act, consistent with the National Contingency Plan, to assure that the [volatile or-
ganic compounds] it has discovered outside of the waste disposal area of the Un-
iontown Landfill, but within the property boundaries of the Landfill, do not
become a threat to health or the environment." Id.
It should be noted, however, that EPA conducted a site inspection of the land-
fill on February 12, 1986. See Site Inspection Report for Darlarge Landfill
(Rumpke of Indiana) at 1-3, Rumpke (No. 96-1650). The Indiana Department of
Environmental Management had initially identified the Uniontown site "as poten-
tially requiring investigation" because industrial waste had possibly been accepted
at the site during the time that the Darlages owned the landfill. Id. Three ground-
water and three sediment samples were taken. See id. The groundwater samples
showed no signs of contamination. See id. Despite finding several metals in the
sediment samples, EPA concluded that they did not need to perform any further
investigations of the Uniontown site. See id.
106. See Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1237. The Cummins group argued that because
Rumpke's suit presented claims for contribution, these claims were barred as mat-
ters already addressed in the settlement. See id. They argued that, by using the
appropriate ellipses, the consent decree covered actions "arising out of... the ...
transportation ... of any materials.., from... the Seymour site." Id. at 1237-38.
The Cummins group reasoned that Rumpke's claim alleged that materials had
been transported from the Seymour site to the Uniontown site. See id. at 1238.
The Cummins group argued, therefore, that this claim falls "squarely within the
language" of the consent decree, thereby barring the claim under section
113(f)(2) of CERCLA. Id.
1998]
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granted a cross-motion for summary judgment made by Rumpke on
the issue of the consent decree. 10 7 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
first concluded that Rumpke's suit may proceed under both sec-
tions 107(a) and 113(f)(1) of CERCLA.10 8 Next, the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's decision and held that the consent
decree did not insulate the Cummins group from a contribution
action brought by Rumpke pertaining to the Uniontown site.109
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Rumpke, the Seventh Circuit faced the issue of whether the
1982 Seymour settlement protected the Cummins group from the
suit brought by Rumpke.110 The Seventh Circuit stated that before
this issue could be addressed, it must first determine whether
107. See id. at 1238. The district court held that CERCLA and SARA "antici-
pate site-specific remedial activity." Id. Accordingly, the district court held that
"the settlement authority of the United States is limited to the individual facility."
Id. The district court also noted in its decision that, in addition to the express
claim for contribution under section 113(f) (1) of CERCLA, Rumpke's case was in
part based on a section 107(a) claim. See id. Next, the district court recognized
that the Seventh Circuit's decision in Akzo created the "innocent landowner excep-
tion." See id. The district court, however, was factually uncertain whether Rumpke
was eligible for the exception and accordingly, denied summary judgment on this
issue. See id. The district court later denied reconsideration of the order and sub-
sequently certified the order for interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See id.
108. See id. at 1241. The Seventh Circuit found that the "innocent landowner
exception" was applicable if Rumpke was in fact the "innocent party" that it
claimed to be. See id. at 1241-42. The Seventh Circuit held, therefore, that
Rumpke may be entitled to bring an action under section 107(a). See id. at 1241.
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit held that if the cost recovery action failed be-
cause Rumpke was found to have participated in the contamination of the site,
Rumpke would be entitled to bring an action under section 113(f) (1) for contribu-
tion. See id. at 1242.
109. See id. at 1242-43. The Seventh Circuit found that the consent decree
signed by the Cummins group was inapplicable to the suit brought by Rumpke
because it did not address the settling parties' liability in connection with the Un-
iontown site. See id. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning regarding
the scope of the consent decree, see infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
110. See id. at 1236. In response to the Seventh Circuit's order to identify the
questions to be certified, the district court posed the following question of law:
"[W] hether Rumpke's action against Settlors is barred pursuant to the earlier con-
sent decree with the United States." Id. at 1238. From that question, the following
additional questions arose:
(1) whether the pertinent environmental statutes limit the settlement au-
thority of the United States to individual facilities;
(2) whether a settlement dealing with one facility (here, Seymour) may
bar liability for waste disposed by or through that facility to another
one (here, Uniontown); and
(3) whether the consent decree itself is ambiguous, thus making a ruling
on its effect as a matter of law inappropriate.
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Rumpke's suit should proceed under section 107 (a), section
113(f) (1) or both."a'
A. Rumpke's Section 107(a) Claim
The Seventh Circuit started with the assumption that Rumpke
did nothing to contribute to the presence of the hazardous sub-
stances found and emphasized that Rumpke's status as a PRP was
based solely on the fact that it was the current owner of the Union-
town site." 2 Using this assumption, the Seventh Circuit then ana-
lyzed whether the exception that it had previously established in
Akzo applied. 113 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit found it neces-
sary to briefly examine the facts surrounding its decision in Akzo." 4
The Seventh Circuit in Rumpke noted the distinction made in
Akzo between the party who was responsible in some way for the
contamination and a "landowner forced to clean up hazardous
materials that a third party spilled onto its property or that mi-
grated there from adjacent lands."115 The Seventh Circuit then
For the pertinent text of the consent decree, see supra note 103. For a discus-
sion of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning regarding the scope of the consent decree,
see infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
111. See Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1239. The district court did not decide whether
Rumpke's suit could proceed under section 107(a) of CERCLA because it believed
there were issues of fact to be resolved prior to deciding that issue. See id. The
Seventh Circuit noted that the contribution bar of section 113(f) (2) of CERCLA,
which prohibits recovery from parties who have resolved their liability in settle-
ment agreements, did not apply to actions for cost recovery. See id. at 1242. The
Seventh Circuit reasoned that the consent decree would therefore only have to be
considered if Rumpke was limited to an action for contribution. See id. at 1239.
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held that the most appropriate way to address
Rumpke's suit was to first determine whether Rumpke was entitled to bring a claim
for cost recovery, then address whether an action for contribution was permissible
and, finally, address the scope of the consent decree. See id.
112. See id. The Seventh Circuit further assumed that Rumpke acquired the
site "without knowledge of the presence of environmental hazards and after all the
deposits had been made." Id.
113. See id. at 1239-40. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit considered:
[M]ay a landowner PRP bring a direct liability suit for cost recovery under
§ 107(a) against other PRPs (in this case "arrangers"), if it contributed
nothing to the hazardous conditions at the site, or is the Akzo exception
available only to a narrower group of parties, such as the landowner who
discovers someone surreptitiously dumping wastes on its land?
Id. For a discussion of the "innocent landowner exception," see supra note 66 and
accompanying text.
114. See id. at 1240. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that the plaintiff in Akzo
and the plaintiff in Rumpke were distinguishable. See id. Akzo itself had sent haz-
ardous materials to the site while Rumpke had not caused the site to become con-
taminated. See id. For a discussion of the facts in Akzo, see supra notes 61-66 and
accompanying text.
115. Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1240 (quoting Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aligner Corp.,
30 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994)). The Seventh Circuit in Rumpke placed particular
RUMPKE1998]
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used this distinction to conclude that "when two parties who both
injured the property have a dispute about who pays how much - a
derivative liability, apportionment dispute - the statute directs them
to § 113(f) and only to § 113(f)."1 16 In addition, the Seventh Cir-
cuit noted that the distinction made in Akzo, as well as the holdings
of some other courts, "have acknowledged that a class of cases
might remain in which a PRP might sue under § 107(a). 1 17
Drawing from its analysis in Akzo, the Seventh Circuit in
Rumpke found that there was "nothing in the language of § 107(a)
that would make it unavailable to a party suing to recover for direct
injury to its own land, under circumstances where it is not trying to
apportion costs.""18 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit held that the
language of section 113(f) indicated that Rumpke's section 107(a)
claim was consistent with CERCLA as a whole.' 19 The Seventh Cir-
importance on its conclusion in Akzo that the plaintiff was liable in part for the
contamination of the site, stating, "the costs it has incurred should be apportioned
equitably amongst itself and the others responsible." Id. (quoting Akzo, 30 F.3d at
764).
116. Id. The Seventh Circuit noted that decisions in this area have been
somewhat inconsistent. See id. The Seventh Circuit concluded, however, that
"[t]he other courts of appeals that have considered the problem have agreed with
our conclusion that claims properly characterized as those for contribution may
normally be brought only under § 113(f)." Id. (citing Redwing Carriers, Inc. v.
Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Colo-
rado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1534-36 (10th Cir. 1995); United Tech. Corp. v.
Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 101-03 (1st Cir. 1994); Amoco Oil Co. v. Bor-
den, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1989)). The Seventh Circuit, emphasizing
the "innocence" of Rumpke, pointed out that in all of these cases the plaintiff
PRPs had themselves contributed to the contamination. See id.
117. Id. (citing Akzo, 30 F.3d at 764; Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1496; United
Tech., 33 F.3d at 99 n.8). For a discussion of the language that the Seventh Circuit
relied on in Rumpke from the Akzo decision, see supra note 66 and accompanying
text.
118. Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1240. The Seventh Circuit explained that only one
of two possibilities could result from a landowner's suit under section 107(a):
[E]ither the facts would establish that the landowner was truly blameless,
in which case the other PRPs would be entitled to bring a suit under
§ 113(f) within three years of the judgment to establish their liability
among themselves, or the facts would show that the landowner was also
partially responsible, in which case it would not be entitled to recover
under its § 107(a) theory and only the § 113(f) claim would go forward.
Id. The Seventh Circuit noted that "[n]either one of those outcomes is inconsis-
tent with the statutory scheme promoting allocation of liability." Id. at 1240-41.
119. See id. at 1241. The Seventh Circuit relied on the following opening sen-
tence of section 113(f) (1): "Any person may seek contribution from any other per-
son who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) . . . of this title, during
or following any civil action under section 9606 .. .or under section 9607(a) of
this title." Id. (quoting CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(1) (1994)). The
Seventh Circuit explained that Rumpke's suit was following neither a section 106
proceeding nor a section 107 proceeding; instead Rumpke was bringing its own
section 107(a) action. See id. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit noted that if
[Vol. IX: p. 511
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cuit then cautioned that if section 107(a) was read as "implicitly
denying standing to sue" to landowners who were not at all respon-
sible for creating the contamination found at the site, "this would
come perilously close to reading § 107(a) itself out of the stat-
ute."'120 The Seventh Circuit concluded that landowners who allege
that "they did not pollute the site in any way" may sue under section
107(a) to recover their direct response costs. 121
B. Rumpke's Section 113(f)(1) Claim
The Seventh Circuit then briefly addressed the status of
Rumpke's claim for contribution under section 113(f) (1).122 The
Seventh Circuit held that if Rumpke was found to be partially re-
sponsible for the contamination of the Uniontown site, then its suit
could only proceed under section 113(f) as an action for contribu-
Rumpke was found to be liable for the contamination at the Uniontown site,
Rumpke would not qualify for the "innocent landowner exception." See id. The
Seventh Circuit further noted that in this situation, Rumpke would still be entitled
to bring an action for contribution for its expenses from other PRPs, provided
Rumpke met the requirements of section 113(f) (1). See id. The Seventh Circuit
acknowledged that "this seems to provide a disincentive for parties voluntarily to
undertake cleanup operations, because a § 106 or § 107(a) action apparently must
either be ongoing or already completed before § 113(f) (1) is available." Id. The
Seventh Circuit justified the potentially negative impact of the Rumpke decision by
describing it as "what the statute requires." Id.
120. Id. The Seventh Circuit found that if plaintiffs like Rumpke were denied
the opportunity of bringing an action under section 107(a), there would be very
few private party plaintiffs entitled to use this provision. See id. The Seventh Cir-
cuit expanded on this theory, stating "[t]ruly innocent private party plaintiffs
would be limited to, for example, a neighbor of a contaminated site who has acted
to stem threatened releases for which he is not responsible ... or a party who can
claim one of the complete defenses as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)." Id. (quot-
ing Steams & Foster Bedding Co. v. Franklin Holding Corp., 947 F. Supp. 790, 801
(D.NJ. 1996)) (citations omitted). For further discussion of Stearns & Foster Bed-
ding, see supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text and infra notes 172-74 and ac-
companying text.
121. Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1241. In holding that Rumpke, a plaintiff PRP, may
bring an action under section 107(a), the Seventh Circuit made two important
points. First, the Seventh Circuit noted that its decision was consistent with its
previous decision in Akzo by finding no distinction "between this situation and a
case where a landowner discovers that someone has been surreptitiously dumping
hazardous materials on property it already owns, apart from the potentially more
difficult question of fact about the landowner's own responsibility in the latter
case." Id. at 1242. Second, the Seventh Circuit noted that the contribution bar of
section 113(f) (2), which prohibits recovery from parties who have resolved their
liability in settlement agreements, plays no role in an action brought under section
107(a). See id. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that "[c]ontribution among the de-
fendants could be of no possible benefit to a party entitled to recover its full direct
costs, nor could the settlement carve-out feature of § 113(f) (2) be of any possible
benefit to Rumpke as a Uniontown PRP." Id.
122. See id. at 1242.
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tion.1 23 At this point in the analysis, the Seventh Circuit empha-
sized the importance of the contribution bar under section
113(f) (2), which prohibits recovery from parties who have resolved
their liability in settlement agreements. 124
C. Matters Addressed in the Settlement
In determining the scope of the Seymour settlement, the Sev-
enth Circuit began by analyzing the specific language of the con-
sent decree.1 25 The Seventh Circuit concluded that there was
nothing to suggest that the "Seymour decree addressed the settling
parties' liability for waste from Seymour Recycling dumped at virtu-
ally any or every other spot on the globe, including the Uniontown
landfill."1 26 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit noted that, read as a
123. See id. Once again, the Seventh Circuit in Rumpke relied on its previous
decision in Akzo. See id. at 1242. The Seventh Circuit found that the decision in
Akzo indicated that if the plaintiff actively participated in the contamination of the
site, the plaintiff must be limited to actions for contribution. See id. at 1240.
124. See id. To determine the scope of the contribution bar, the Seventh Cir-
cuit considered whether the Seymour settlement addressed the Cummins group
liability for the cleanup of sites other than the Seymour site. Id. For a discussion
on the scope of the consent decree, see infra notes 125-28, 176-78 and accompany-
ing text.
125. See Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1242. The Seventh Circuit relied on its previous
holding in Akzo, where it held that "the 'matters addressed' by a consent decree
must be assessed in a manner consistent with both the reasonable expectations of
the signatories and the equitable apportionment of costs that Congress has envi-
sioned." Id. (quoting Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 766 (7th
Cir. 1994)). In particular, the Seventh Circuit relied on the holding in Akzo that
the consent decree did not bar the plaintiffs claim since "'Akzo's work [stood]
apart in kind, context, and time from the work envisioned in the consent decree
.... 'Id. (quoting Akzo, 30 F.3d at 767). The Seventh Circuit in Rumpke then
found that the cleanup done at the Uniontown site was "apart in 'kind, context,
and time' from the Seymour surface cleanup." Id.
126. Id. The Seventh Circuit in Rumpke, emphasizing the concern previously
expressed in the Akzo decision, found that the terms of a consent decree that affect
a third party must be explicitly stated. See id. (citing Akzo, 30 F.3d at 766 n.8, 768).
The Seventh Circuit in Rumpke cited the following provisions from the consent
decree to demonstrate that the decree in the Seymour settlement specifically de-
fined the parties' obligations and responsibilities for the Seymour Recycling site
only:
Exhibit B of the decree defined the decree's object as "The Removal and
Disposal of Drummed Hazardous Chemicals and Waste Materials Located
at: Seymour Recycling Center[,] Seymour, Indiana." Section VIII of the
decree gave the United States, the State, and their authorized representa-
tives "access to the Seymour site at all times until such time as the Work is
completed." Section IX allowed the various governmental authorities
.access to the site for the sampling of wastes at the site . . . ." Section XII
itself, on which the Cummins group has pinned its hopes, declared it to
be the intention of the parties "[t]o avoid litigation ... in connection
with the Seymour site .... "
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whole, the consent decree was not ambiguous, and therefore, did
not allow extrinsic evidence to be admitted.12 7 The Seventh Circuit
held that the consent decree only protected the Cummins group
from actions for contribution for matters directly related to the Sey-
mour site, and not actions pertaining to a separate and distinct site,
like that of the Uniontown site.1 28
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Seventh Circuit's holding on Rumpke's section 107(a)
claim is inconsistent with that of other courts and creates results
that are contrary to CERCLA's purposes. 129 On the other hand, the
Seventh Circuit correctly held that the 1982 Seymour settlement
did not protect the Cummins group from an action for contribu-
tion brought by Rumpke. 3 0
127. See id. at 1242-43. The Seventh Circuit, relying on several Supreme
Court cases, found that it was not appropriate for extrinsic evidence to be consid-
ered when the decree is clear on its face. See id. at 1243. The Seventh Circuit
refused to admit the affidavits from the settling defendants' lawyer "about what he
really meant in approving the language of section XII." See id. at 1243.
128. See id. at 1243. The Seventh Circuit was unpersuaded by the Cummins
group's attempt to use ellipses to demonstrate that the consent decree could have
covered the "transportation ... of any materials... from ... the Seymour site." Id.
The Seventh Circuit responded:
If we are playing with ellipses, we could also say that the decree covers
matters "arising out of the.. . transportation... of ny materials ... near
the Seymour site," but even Cummins' lawyer agreed that it would be
absurd to conclude that the Cummins group was protected even if any of
its wastes had ever been "near" Seymour, perhaps passing on their way to
Uniontown or other locales.
Id.
The Seventh Circuit concluded its opinion by stating that "nothing in the per-
tinent environmental statutes theoretically limits the power of the United States to
enter into a settlement that addresses more than one facility." Id. (citing Akzo, 30
F.3d at 766 n.8, 768). The intent to include more than one site in a settlement
agreement, however, "must appear far more plainly in the language of the agree-
ment than we have here." Id.
129. Most notably, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Rumpke was partially in-
consistent with its holding in AM International, decided eight days prior to the
Rumpke decision. See generally AM Int'l, Inc. v. Datacard Corp., 106 F.3d 1342 (7th
Cir. 1997). For a discussion of this inconsistency, see infra notes 143-44 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion of the adverse effects the decision in Rumpke
has on the goals of CERCLA, see infra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.
130. See Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1242-43. Even though the scope of the consent
decree was the central issue in this case, the majority of the Seventh Circuit's analy-
sis was devoted to whether Rumpke's action should proceed under section 107(a),
section 113(f) or both. See id. at 1239-42. For an analysis of the Seventh Circuit's
interpretation of the consent decree, see supra notes 125-28 and accompanying
text.
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A. Analysis of the Section 107(a) Claim
Other courts' decisions addressing the issue of a PRP bringing
an action under section 107(a) have been divided. 131 These deci-
sions can be broadly classified into two categories. Courts in the
first category have held that all parties, regardless of PRP status,
may bring a claim under section 107(a), while courts in the second
category have held that only parties not responsible for causing the
contamination may bring claims under section 107(a).13 2 The Sev-
enth Circuit in Rumpke held that "normally" PRPs are not permitted
to bring a section 107(a) claim; however, in the case where the
plaintiff is a PRP solely due to its status as the landowner of a haz-
ardous site, that plaintiff is entitled to bring such an action. 133 By
not requiring the plaintiff to prove it was not responsible for caus-
ing the contamination of the site, the Seventh Circuit created a new
standard for a PRP bringing an action under section 107(a).134
The Seventh Circuit's decision can be distinguished from the
reasoning of other courts that have addressed whether PRPs may
131. See Panzer, supra note 3, at 443-44 (discussing that courts are split over
whether PRPs are entitled to bring claims under section 107); see generally Baicker-
McKee & Singer, supra note 11 (stating courts have not yet "reconciled" sections
107(a) and 113(f)). For further discussion of the division among the courts in
addressing actions by PRPs for cost recovery, see infra notes 150-55 and accompa-
nying text.
132. See Hernandez, supra note 8, at 111-13. Some commentators have fur-
ther distinguished court decisions addressing whether a PRP can bring an action
for cost recovery. See id. These commentators have noted that some courts have
allowed a PRP to bring an action under section 107(a) and then have allocated
liability according to section 113 (f). See id. Such courts are essentially holding that
sections 107(a) and 113(f) work together to form a single cause of action. See
Baicker-McKee & Singer, supra note 11 (discussing interplay of sections 107(a) and
113(0 (1)).
133. See Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1240-41. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that
"[o] n the basis of the present record, we must regard [Rumpke] as a landowner on
whose property others dumped hazardous materials, before Rumpke even owned
the property." Id. at 124142. The Seventh Circuit, therefore, applied the "inno-
cent landowner exception," established in Akzo, and held that Rumpke was entitled
to bring an action under section 107(a) of CERCLA. See id. at 1241-42. For an
analysis of the "innocent landowner exception" and its application by the Seventh
Circuit, see infra notes 148-64 and accompanying text.
134. See Waste Liability: Federal Appeals Court Rules Operators Can Sue Other Sites to
Recover Costs, 28 Solid Waste Rep. (Business Publishers, Inc.) No. 15, at 117 (Apr.
10, 1997), available in 1997 WL 10909436. Commentators have interpreted the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Rumpke as automatically entitling waste facility site
owners who receive wastes from other sites to sue the owners of the site from which
the waste originated for cost recovery under section 107(a). See id. "The 7th Cir-
cuit's new standard would appear to be that a party facing CERCLA liability
'merely due to its status as landowner' qualifies for the plaintiff-friendly tools of
CERCLA's section 107(a) cost-recovery provision." Richard M. Kuntz, Court Ex-
pands Chances for Recovering Costs, CHI. DAMv L. BULL., Feb. 27, 1997, at 6.
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bring actions for cost recovery on three primary points. First, the
Seventh Circuit reasoned that Rumpke's voluntary cleanup of the
site and the lack of knowledge of the contamination before
purchasing the site minimized the significance of its PRP status. 135
Second, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the language of section
107(a) as creating an exception for landowners of a hazardous
waste site who were not actively involved in the contamination of
the site.136 Finally, the Seventh Circuit did not require the ele-
ments of the innocent landowner defense to be met.137
1. Voluntary Cleanup and Knowledge of the Contamination
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by indicating that
Rumpke had begun the cleanup of the Uniontown site strictly vol-
untarily.138 Other courts, however, have generally focused solely on
a party's PRP status, regardless of whether the party initiated
cleanup voluntarily.' 39 In Kaufman, for example, the court held
that "any and all responsible parties, even those who have ex-
135. See Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1239. The Seventh Circuit relied on Rumpke's
lack of knowledge of the contamination, despite Rumpke's failure to perform an
environmental audit of the site before purchasing it. See id. at 1236, 1239. For a
discussion on how the decision by the Seventh Circuit in Rumpke differed from the
holdings of other courts on this issue, see infra notes 138-47 and accompanying
text.
136. For a discussion of how the Seventh Circuit in Rumpke, as well as other
courts, have interpreted the language of section 107(a) of CERCLA, see infra notes
148-64 and accompanying text.
137. For a discussion of how courts have applied the innocent landowner de-
fense, see infra notes 165-75 and accompanying text.
138. See Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1239. Rumpke pointed out both in its brief and
at oral argument that it had never been the subject of any administrative cleanup
order from any federal, state or other public authority. See id. In addition,
Rumpke noted that no party had ever brought a section 107 action against
Rumpke. See id. Rumpke stated that it intended to act consistent with the NCP so
that the site could be cleaned up properly and all of the danger associated with the
contamination could be eliminated. See id. The Seventh Circuit indicated that
Rumpke's status as a PRP was "based solely on its ownership of the Uniontown
site." Id. at 1239. Rumpke's voluntary cleanup of the site was a factor that the
Seventh Circuit attempted to use to distinguish Rumpke from a liable party. See id.
139. See, e.g., Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489,
1498 (lth Cir. 1996). In Redwing Carriers, Saraland Apartments constructed an
apartment complex on a site that was at one time owned by Redwing Carriers. See
id. at 1494. During an inspection by the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development, significant contamination of the site was discovered. See id.
The Eleventh Circuit noted that Redwing Carriers was a responsible party under
CERCLA because it had "originally disposed of most, if not all, of the hazardous
substances now contaminating the Site." Id. at 1496. More importantly, the Elev-
enth Circuit indicated that Saraland Apartments was also a responsible party be-
cause it was the current owner of the contaminated site. See id. at 1498. The
Eleventh Circuit stated that "[i]t is therefore settled that a person is a responsible
party under subsection 107(a) (1) if they are the current owner or operator of a
19981
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pended response costs voluntarily, are confined to bringing contri-
bution actions under § 9613(f)."1 40
facility .... [Saraland Apartments] thus concedes it is a potentially responsible
party under subsection 107(a)(1) as the current owner of the property." Id.
Similarly, in Amoco Oil the plaintiff purchased a site which was later found to
be contaminated. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 666 (5th Cir.
1989). The plaintiff immediately initiated the cleanup of the site, without any fed-
eral or state administrative orders to do so. See id. While assessing what damages
should be awarded for the costs the plaintiff incurred during the cleanup, the Fifth
Circuit stated that "[a]s an owner of a facility that continues to release a hazardous
substance, Amoco shares joint and several liability for remedial actions with [the
other PRPs]." Id. at 672. The Fifth Circuit, therefore, considered Amoco a liable
party, even though it engaged in voluntary cleanup of the hazardous substances.
See id.; see also Hydro-Mfg., Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 903 F. Supp. 273, 276-77
(D.R.I. 1995) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that consent decree indicates no lia-
bility and holding that plaintiffs status as PRP determines CERCLA liability).
Commentators have argued that allowing private parties who voluntarily clean
up a hazardous site to bring cost recovery actions would "promote [ ] the important
CERCLA policy of encouraging the voluntary cleanup of hazardous waste sites."
Borough of Sayreville v. Union Carbride Corp., 923 F. Supp. 671, 679 n.12 (D.NJ.
1996). A private liable party would be more likely to take the initiative and begin
cleanup measures if there was an opportunity to gain a "windfall" by recovering all
of the costs of the cleanup, including those costs for which that liable party was
responsible. See id. This "windfall" argument has been held to "unfairly benefit a
PRP who has access to cash and is willing to front load cleanup costs for an oppor-
tunity to be indemnified in a cost recovery action." Id. Furthermore, the "wind-
fall" argument has been rejected as being illusory. See id. (citing Kaufman &
Broad-South Bay v. Unisys Corp., 868 F. Supp. 1212, 1215 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1994)).
For example, if parties were found liable under section 107(a) for all of the costs
of a cleanup, they could then bring an action under section 113(f) for contribu-
tion for the pro rata share of the private party that brought the cost recovery ac-
tion. See id.
140. Kaufman, 868 F. Supp. at 1215. The First Circuit in United Technologies
held that "it is sensible to assume that Congress intended only innocent parties -
not parties who were themselves liable - to be permitted to recoup the whole of
their expenditures." United Tech. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d
96, 100 (1st Cir. 1994). Additionally, the First Circuit stated that section 113(f)
"allows a 'non-innocent' party (i.e., a party who himself is liable) only to seek re-
coupment of that portion of his expenditures which exceeds his pro rata share of
the overall liability - in other words, to seek contribution rather than complete
indemnity." Id. In Kaufman, while explaining that its holding was consistent with
the holding in United Technologies, the court stated that "United Technologies clearly
holds that only innocent parties may bring cost recovery actions and makes no
distinction between liable parties who have been forced to incur cleanup costs and
those who have done so voluntarily." Kaufman, 868 F. Supp. at 1215; see also New
Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1121 (3d Cir. 1997) (us-
ing rational in United Technologies to arrive at same holding); Ekotek Site PRP
Comm. v. Self, 881 F. Supp. 1516, 1521 (D. Utah 1995) (stating it was "the plain-
tiff's status as a PRP, and not the degree of voluntariness with which it initiated
cleanup activity" which limits plaintiffs claim to contribution); but see Bethlehem
Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 221, 224 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (stat-
ing that United Technologies holding "suggests that if a plaintiff remediates a site
with no governmental prodding," it is not prohibited from bringing action under
section 107).
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Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit relied on its assumption that
Rumpke had acquired the land "without knowledge of the presence
of environmental hazards and after all the deposits had been
made."1 4 1 While the significance of this factor has not been settled
by the courts, the analysis made by the Seventh Circuit in Rumpke is
inconsistent with the reasoning of prior decisions.1
42
The Seventh Circuit itself, in fact, had recently held in AM In-
ternational that knowledge of the contamination is irrelevant in de-
termining whether a party can bring an action for cost recovery.
143
In AM International, the Seventh Circuit permitted a landowner to
bring suit under section 107(a) even though the landowner was
aware of the contamination of the site prior to purchasing it, and in
fact, purchased the site for a reduced price because of it.14 4 More-
over, the reasoning in Rumpke is also inconsistent with the decision
141. Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1239.
142. See id. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that Rumpke's lack of knowledge
of the contamination indicated that Rumpke did not actively participate in the
contamination of the Uniontown site. See id. The Seventh Circuit found that this
was an important factor distinguishing Rumpke from a party that was liable for the
contamination. See id. Based on the fact that Rumpke had not caused the site to
become contaminated, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the "innocent
landowner exception" could be applied. See id. at 1239-40. In concluding that the
exception did apply, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that a landowner who did noth-
ing to contribute to the hazardous conditions of the site was comparable to the
landowner that discovers someone dumping hazardous materials on property it
already owns. See id. at 1241-42. For the pertinent text in the Akzo decision creat-
ing the innocent landowner exception, see supra note 66.
143. AM Int'l Inc. v. Datacard Corp., 106 F.3d 1342, 1346 (7th Cir. 1997).
The Seventh Circuit in Rumpke did not mention its earlier decision in AM Interna-
tional, but focused primarily on its decision in Akzo as a basis for its holding. See
Kuntz, supra note 134. Commentators have drawn several conclusions about the
holdings in AM International and Rumpke despite the Seventh Circuit's failure to
address the implications that these cases have when analyzed together. See generally
id. The holdings suggest that the Seventh Circuit will allow purchasers who have
knowledge of the contamination and who would clearly not meet the test of the
innocent landowner defense to bring actions against other PRPs under section
107(a). See generally id. For a discussion of the elements of the innocent land-
owner defense, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
144. See AM Int'; 106 F.3d at 1347. Aside from the significance placed on the
knowledge of the contamination, the reasoning in Rumpke and AM International
was very similar. The Seventh Circuit in AM International found that the case fell
into the "innocent landowner exception" it had created previously in Akzo by stat-
ing that "if a landowner faces liability solely because a third party spilled or allowed
hazardous waste to migrate onto its property, the landowner may directly sue for
its response costs." Id. (citing Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764
(7th Cir. 1994)). The Seventh Circuit in AM International assumed that Datacard
Corporation purchased the site for a reduced cost "because it knew it was buying
into an expensive cleanup." Id. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that this may have
made Datacard Corporation "a little less 'innocent' than the landowner described
in Akzo" and therefore, concluded that "Datacard qualifies under Akzo's exception
and can directly pursue its response costs under § 107(a) (4) (B)." Id.
1998]
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in Amoco Oil, where the Fifth Circuit addressed the situation of a
landowner that was unaware of the contamination of a site before
purchasing it.14 5 The Fifth Circuit in Amoco Oil held that the cur-
rent landowner of a contaminated site shares joint and several lia-
bility. 146 The Fifth Circuit then held that the plaintiff landowner
was limited to an action for contribution regardless of whether the
owner knew the site was contaminated before it was purchased. 147
2. "Innocent Landowner Exception"
The Seventh Circuit in Rumpke concluded that there is nothing
in the language of the cost recovery provision that would make an
action for cost recovery "unavailable to a party suing to recover for
direct injury to its own land, under circumstances where it is not
trying to apportion costs."'1 48 While acknowledging that technically
Rumpke was a PRP, the Seventh Circuit, nevertheless held that as a
landowner claiming innocence of any contamination on the site,
Rumpke was entitled to bring an action for cost recovery under sec-
tion 107(a). 149
145. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1990). In
Amoco Oil, the owner of the hazardous site purchased the land knowing that "a
pile" of phosphogypsum existed on the site, but did not know of the radioactive
nature of this substance. See id. at 666. For a discussion of the facts of Amoco Oi4
see supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
146. See id. at 672.
147. See id.; see also Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus. Inc., No.
CIV.A.94-0752, 1996 WL 557592, at *47 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 1996) ("Under
§ 9607(a) (1) of CERCLA, the present owners and operators of a site are liable for
response costs without regard to whether hazardous substances were disposed of at
the site during the tenure of the owner or operator.").
148. Id. at 1240. The Seventh Circuit held that "landowners who allege that
they did not pollute the site in any way may sue for their direct response costs
under § 107(a)." Id. at 1241. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning,
see supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
149. See id. at 1239-41. The Seventh Circuit concluded that allowing a PRP, by
virtue of its landowner status, to bring an action under section 107(a) would not
be "inconsistent with the statutory scheme promoting allocation of liability." Id. at
1240-41.
Section 107(a) (1) of CERCLA lists as "covered" the "owner or operator of the
facility." CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1). Other courts have held that,
according to this provision, landowners should not be treated any differently than
the other categories of PRPs. See, e.g., Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apart-
ments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1498 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that "a person is a responsible
party under subsection 107 (a) (1) if they are the current owner" of hazardous site);
Amoco Oil, 889 F.2d at 672 (holding plaintiff owner of facility where hazardous
waste had been found "shares joint and several liability for remedial actions");
Stearns & Foster Bedding Co. v. Franklin Holding Corp., 947 F. Supp. 790, 798 n.3
(D.N.J. 1996) (stating "[a]s the current owner of the Site, Stearns & Foster is, at
the very least, a potentially responsible party under CERCLA"); Plaskon Elec.
Materials, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 644, 652 (N.D. Ohio 1995) ("[It
is quite clear that [the plaintiff] is liable under § 107(a) because it is the owner of
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Courts holding that all parties, including PRPs, are entitled to
bring actions for cost recovery have not distinguished landowners,
who did not cause the contamination, from the other classes of
PRPs.150 The Sixth Circuit in Velsicol Chemical held that under the
language of section 107(a), the only way an action for cost recovery
brought by a PRP could be barred was if the defendants were able
to prove they were innocent under section 107(b).15 1 Similarly, in
Bethlehem Iron Works, the court stated that "[a] n examination of the
text of sections 107 and 113 gives no indication that PRPs are pro-
hibited from bringing claims pursuant to section 107."152
the Site."); Kaufman & Broad-South Bay v. Unisys Corp., 868 F. Supp. 1212, 1216
(N.D. Cal. 1994) (stating plaintiff, "as a current owner of a site, is a potentially
responsible party under CERCLA"); Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New
Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (D. Del. 1987), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir.
1988) (holding CERCLA "applies to all current owners and operators regardless of
whether they owned or operated the facility at the time of hazardous waste
disposal").
150. See Companies for Fair Allocation v. Axil Corp., 853 F. Supp. 575, 579 (D.
Conn. 1994). In Axil the court held that the language "any other person" in sec-
tion 107 "implies that Congress intended the liability provision to sweep broadly."
Id. (citing United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1264 (D. Del.
1986)). Despite Congress's silence on whether the language "any other person"
includes other PRPs, many courts have held that allowing all PRPs to proceed with
section 107 actions is consistent with Congress's intentions for a broad scope of
liability. See id.; see also United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 261
(3d Cir. 1992) (indicating "[w]e should not rewrite the [CERCLA] statute simply
because the definition of one of its terms is broad in scope"); Chesapeake & Poto-
mac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1992) (finding
nothing in statute that precluded any PRP from bringing claim under section
107(a)); but see Borough of Sayreville v. Union Carbide Corp., 923 F. Supp. 671,
680 (D.N.J. 1996) (holding that action brought by PRP against another PRP is
attempt to apportion liability and that such action is governed by section 113(0)).
151. SeeVelsicol Chem. Corp. v. Enenco, Inc., 9 F.3d 524, 530 (6th Cir. 1993).
The Sixth Circuit held that it would not "deviate from the plain statutory language
of section 107[(a)]." Id. The Sixth Circuit held that the doctrine of laches, the
defense asserted by the defendants, was not a defense to CERCLA liability under
section 107(b). See id. Since the defendant could not establish a defense to liabil-
ity, the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff PRP was entitled to bring an action
under section 107(a). See id. In doing so, the Sixth Circuit relied on the following
quotation:
While it may be logical to permit equitable defenses in an inherently eq-
uitable proceeding, and sections 106.. . and 113... both permit equita-
ble considerations, the clear answer for section 107 is that Congress
explicitly limited the defenses available to only those three provided in
section 107(b). It is within the powers of Congress to so limit the district
courts' discretion, and Congress did so in section 107.
Id. (quoting United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 427 (D.N.J. 1991)).
152. Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 221, 225
(E.D. Pa. 1995). The court stated that "section 107 imposes liability on PRPs for
necessary response costs incurred by 'any other person'. . .. [T]he text provides
no indication that this implied right is limited to 'innocent' private parties." Id.
Furthermore, the court reasoned that since the provision is broadly worded and
there is no mention of the plaintiffs PRP status in the defenses provided in section
1998] RUMPKE 547
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The majority of recent circuit courts, however, have held that
PRPs are not permitted to bring claims under section 107(a) of
CERCLA. 153 These courts have generally relied on United Technolo-
gies, where the First Circuit defined contribution as "a claim 'by and
between jointly and severally liable parties for an appropriate divi-
sion of the payment one of them has been compelled to make." 15 4
Courts have found additional support in Pinal Creek, where the
Ninth Circuit held that the "duality" of roles implied by the lan-
guage of section 107(a) is best "implemented" by limiting PRPs to
actions for contribution. 155
107(b), Congress must have intended that section 107(a) liability "sweep broadly."
Id. The court found further support in the language of section 113. See id. For
example, the court reasoned that while section 113 does provide "a right of action
for private plaintiffs who voluntarily cleanup, it does not provide that section
113(f) is the exclusive remedy for potentially liable parties." Id.
153. See Buckley, supra note 38, at 865-68. Recent case law indicates a trend
towards denying PRPs the statutory right to bring actions under section 107(a). See
id. at 865. Courts following this trend explain that the plaintiffs standing as a PRP
is the sole factor in limiting the party to actions for contribution. See id. In coming
to this conclusion, courts have relied on three basic points: (1) PRPs are jointly
and severally liable parties, thereby making any claim to reapportion cleanup costs
among PRPs the "quintessential claim for contribution;" (2) permitting PRPs to
recover from other PRPs the costs incurred for cleanup under section 107(a)
would render part of section 113 meaningless; and (3) PRP cost recovery claims
mayjeopardize the protection offered by the contribution bar of section 113(f)(2).
See Panzer, supra note 3, at 453-54.
154. United Tech. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 99 (1st Cir.
1994) (citations omitted). In United Technologies, the First Circuit concluded that
contribution was a "standard legal term that enjoys a stable well-known denota-
tion." Id. The First Circuit held that this definition should be accepted in the
CERCLA provisions "absent evidence that Congress had a different, more exotic
definition in mind." Id. This has, in fact, become the widely accepted definition
of contribution for courts addressing CERCLA contribution issues. See, e.g., In re
Reading, 115 F.3d 1111, 1120-21 (3d Cir. 1997) (adopting First Circuit's definition
of contribution); New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116,
1122 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding "contribution" is "standard legal term").
155. See Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1301-02
(9th Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit found that "[u]nder the literal language of
§ 107," PRPs are partly responsible for their own cleanup costs. Id. at 1301. In
addition, the Ninth Circuit noted the language indicates that a PRP may also hold
other PRPs liable for a portion of those same costs. See id. The Ninth Circuit held
that this duality would best be served by restricting PRPs to actions for contribu-
tion. See id. By interpreting section 107 in this manner, the Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that a PRP would be held responsible only "for that portion of the liability
which it equitably should bear anyway, while being entitled to hold other PRPs
severally liable for each of their, respective, equitable shares of the total costs." Id.
at 1301. The Ninth Circuit concluded that section 107 "implicitly incorporates a
claim for contribution." Id. The Ninth Circuit also stated that "while section 107
created the right of contribution, the 'machinery' of § 113 governs and regulates
such actions, providing the details and explicit recognition that were missing from
the text of § 107." Id. at 1302; see also New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS
Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1122 (3d Cir. 1997) (asserting "section 113 does not in itself
create any new liabilities; rather, it confirms the right of a potentially responsible
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. The Seventh Circuit in Rumpke agreed with this line of hold-
ings, finding that a dispute for the apportionment of costs is con-
trolled by section 113(f) (1).156 The Seventh Circuit, however,
considered Rumpke's situation to be analogous to the innocent
landowner who was forced to clean up hazardous wastes in Akzo. 157
In Rumpke, the Seventh Circuit found that its holding in Akzo indi-
cated that there is an exception to the rule that PRPs are only enti-
fled to bring actions for contribution.15 8 Other courts have not
adopted the "innocent landowner exception" used by the Seventh
Circuit in Rumpke.1
59
person under section 107 to obtain contribution from other potentially responsi-
ble persons."); Transtech Indus. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 798 F. Supp. 1079 (D.N.J.
1992) (finding sections 107 and 113 work together, "one governing liability and
the other governing contribution from those found liable").
In holding that PRPs could only bring actions for contribution against other
PRPs, the Ninth Circuit in Pinal Creek indicated that its holding was "consistent
with the statements by the Supreme Court, and by five other circuits." 118 F.3d at
1303 (citing Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 818 n.ll (1994); New
Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1120; Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94
F.3d 1489, 1496 (lth Cir. 1996); United Tech., 33 F.3d at 99 n.8 & 100; United
States v. Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995); Amoco Oil
Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672-73 (5th Cir. 1989)).
156. See Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 107 F.3d 1235,
1240 (7th Cir. 1997). The Seventh Circuit in Rumpke analyzed its previous holding
in Akzo, focusing on the distinction drawn between the party liable for the contami-
nation and the landowner who was forced to clean up hazardous wastes found on
its property due to the actions of a third party. See id. Using the reasoning in Akzo,
the Seventh Circuit in Rumpke held that where two parties have both caused some
injury to the site and there is a dispute over the apportionment of the costs, the
dispute is governed solely by section 113(f). See id. For a discussion of the Seventh
Circuit's reasoning, see supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
157. See id. at 1241-42. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that Rumpke ac-
quired the land without knowledge of any contamination and after all of the haz-
ardous deposits were made. See id. at 1239. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the
landowner who fails to discover a site's contamination until after it is purchased is
equivalent to the landowner who discovers that "someone has been surreptitiously
dumping hazardous materials on property it already owns." Id. at 1242. The Sev-
enth Circuit in Rumpke noted that according to the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Akzo, landowners in these situations are entitled to use the cost recovery provision.
See id. at 1240-42. For a discussion of the language in Akzo creating the "innocent
landowner exception," see supra note 66.
158. See id. at 1240. It is at this point that the decision in Rumpke becomes
inconsistent with the holdings of other circuit courts. In essence, the Seventh Cir-
cuit relied on the "innocent landowner exception" whereas other courts rely on
the "innocent landowner defense." See id. at 1240-41. The Seventh Circuit in
Rumpke acknowledged that section 113(f) "exists for the express purpose of allocat-
ing fault among PRPs." Id. at 1240. According to the Seventh Circuit, this section
did not apply in Rumpke because Rumpke was not trying to apportion the costs of
the cleanup. See id. As the Seventh Circuit noted, Rumpke was seeking to recover
all of its costs incurred on a direct liability theory. See id.
159. See, e.g., Kaufman & Broad-South Bay v. Unisys Corp., 868 F. Supp. 1212,
1216 (N.D. Cal. 1994). In Kaufman, the court distinguished between the "land-
owner" referred to in the "innocent landowner exception" and the "owner or oper-
1998]
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The Seventh Circuit in Rumpke concluded that the holding in
Akzo creating the "innocent landowner exception" was an acknowl-
edgment that "a class of cases might remain in which a PRP might
sue under § 107(a)." 160 The Seventh Circuit attempted to distin-
guish the PRP in Rumpke's position, a landowner who did not con-
tribute to the contamination, from a PRP, that had actively
participated in contaminating a site.' 61 Unfortunately, the Seventh
ator" of a site which is referred to in section 107. See id. The court, explaining why
Kaufman, a PRP, was not entitled to bring a section 107 action, but the "land-
owner" was entitled to bring such an action, stated that "the landowner [in the
example used in Akzo] is not liable under CERCLA because he is neither a current
nor a past owner or operator of a hazardous waste site." Id. The court in Kaufman
implied that the "innocent landowner exception" created in Akzo was based on the
"threatened release and migration of hazardous materials" occurring during the
landowner's ownership of the property. Id. According to this reasoning, Rumpke
would not qualify for the "innocent landowner exception" because the contamina-
tion occurred before Rumpke purchased the site. See Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1236-37.
The Kaufman court indicated that another example of when a landowner may
bring a cost recovery action occurs when that party, after having been named a
PRP, "can successfully assert one of the affirmative defenses enumerated in
§ 9607(b)." Kaufman, 868 F. Supp. at 1216. The following example given by the
Kaufman court is more applicable to Rumpke's situation and demonstrates how a
PRP can escape CERCLA liability by asserting the third party affirmative defense
listed under section 107(b) (3):
[I] f the EPA sues to compel an owner of a hazardous waste site to remedi-
ate the contamination and the owner incurs response costs but ultimately
establishes that a third party was solely responsible for the contamination,
then the owner would not be a liable party under CERCLA and would be
entitled to seek full recovery of his cleanup costs under § 9607(a).
Id. For further discussion on the use of the affirmative defenses by the courts, see
infra notes 165-75 and accompanying text.
160. Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1240. Other courts have not reached this conclu-
sion. See, e.g., Kaufman, 868 F. Supp. at 1216. In Kaufman, the court explained that
while the Akzo decision may have allowed innocent parties to bring suit under sec-
tion 107(a) of CERCLA, "the reality is that the vast majority of private parties will
be limited to suing for contribution under § 9613(f)." Id. The court reasoned that
"CERCLA imposes liability on virtually every private party who would have a reason
to recoup cleanup costs." Id. A private plaintiff suing under CERCLA, therefore,
will very rarely be "innocent," thus, virtually eliminating the possibility of a private
PRP bringing an action for cost recovery under section 107(a). See id.
161. See Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1240. The Seventh Circuit agreed with other
circuit courts' decisions to limit an action brought by one PRP against another PRP
to an action for contribution. See id. The Seventh Circuit held, however, that it
had already been established that the general rule of limiting PRPs to actions for
contributions does not apply where the plaintiff did not actively participate in the
contamination. See id. at 1241 (citing Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apart-
ments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Colorado & E. R.R.
Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1534-36 (10th Cir. 1995); United Tech. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris
Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 101-03 (1st Cir. 1994); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aligner Corp., 30
F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994); Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672 (5th
Cir. 1989)).
Other courts have not relied on whether the landowner actively participated
in the contamination. See, e.g., Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., No.
CIV.A.94-0752, 1996 WL 557592, at *47 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 1996). The court in Beth-
40
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol9/iss2/5
Circuit neglected the general understanding that liability under
CERCLA is strict and is intended to be without regard to fault or
willingness. 162 As the current owner of a hazardous waste site,
Rumpke is a liable party. 163 Rumpke's lack of actual participation
in the contamination is irrelevant, as liability under CERCLA is not
affected by culpability or responsibility. 164
3. Innocent Landowner Defense
Despite CERCLA's imposition of strict liability, courts holding
that PRPs are limited to actions for contribution have consistently
implied that parties which prove they are "innocent" may bring ac-
tions for cost recovery. 165 To become an "innocent party," the PRP
must successfully assert one of the established affirmative defenses
lehem Iron Works implied that the current owner's involvement in the contamina-
tion was irrelevant. See id. The court held that "the present owners and operators
of a site are liable for the response costs without regard to whether hazardous
substances were disposed of at the site during the tenure of that owner or opera-
tor." Id.
162. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 259 (3d Cir.
1992) (stating "CERCLA imposes strict liability on responsible parties"); New York
v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding section
9607 (a) (1) "unequivocally imposes strict liability on the current owner of a facil-
ity," and that liability is imposed without proof of causation); American Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. v. Harcos Chem., Inc., No. 95-C3750, 1997 WL 281295, at *9 (N.D. Ill.
May 20, 1997) (stating CERCLA "is not concerned with fault"); Stearns & Foster
Bedding Co. v. Franklin Holding Corp., 947 F. Supp. 790, 797 (D.N.J. 1996) (hold-
ing when elements of liability under section 107(a) of CERCLA are met, PRPs
"may be held liable for the response costs under § 9607(a) regardless of intent").
163. See Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 123940; see also Hydro-Mfg., Inc. v. Kayser-Roth
Corp., 903 F. Supp. 273, 276 (D.R.I. 1995). In Hydro-Manufacturing, the plaintiff
purchased the site after it had been contaminated. See id. at 274. EPA performed
a study after the plaintiff had acquired the land and found that adjacent residen-
tial wells were contaminated by hazardous chemicals. See id. The plaintiff argued
it was an innocent party since it had never actively participated in the site's con-
tamination. See id. at 276. Accordingly, the plaintiff sought to bring an action for
cost recovery under section 107 (a). See id.
The court was not persuaded by this argument, however, stating that "[t]his
proposition ignores the plain language and the purpose of CERCLA. The legisla-
tion is designed to impose strict liability on a variety of actors, including past and
present owners, irrespective of their culpability, because the aim of CERCLA is to facili-
tate, repair and clean up." Id. (emphasis added). The court concluded that, ac-
cording to CERCLA, the plaintiff's involvement in the original contamination was
irrelevant. See id. "[S]imply as owner of the site, [the plaintiff] bears partial re-
sponsibility for aiding clean up." Id.
164. See Harcos Chem., 1997 WL 281295, at *6 (stating liability is "not triggered
by culpability or responsibility for the contamination"); Adhesives Research Inc. v.
American Inks & Coating Corp., 931 F. Supp. 1231, 1246 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (holding
party's culpability status was irrelevant in deciding whether party could pursue sec-
tion 107(a) claim).
165. See United Tech., 33 F.3d at 100 (stating "Congress intended only innocent
parties" be entitled to cost recovery actions); Stearns & Foster, 947 F. Supp. at 801
(concluding that plaintiffs may not proceed with section 107 action unless they
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enumerated in section 107(b).166 The Seventh Circuit in Rumpke,
however, did not require that Rumpke first prove that it was inno-
cent according to section 107(b). 167
demonstrate innocence); Kaufman, 868 F. Supp. at 1216 (holding once innocence
is established, plaintiff will be entitled to seek full recovery under section 107).
Courts holding that all parties, including PRPs, may bring actions under sec-
tion 107(a) have found section 107(b) to be inapplicable. See, e.g., AM Int'l, Inc. v.
Datacard Corp., 106 F.3d 1342, 1347 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding even if purchaser
has knowledge of contamination before purchase, purchaser is still entitled to
bring section 107(a) action against other PRPs); Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc. v. Mallinc-
krodt, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 624, 630 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (stating "there is no indication
that the private right of action is limited to 'innocent' private parties"); Pneumo
Abex Corp. v. Bessemer & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 921 F. Supp. 336, 347 (E.D. Va.
1996) (holding that nothing in statute precludes PRP from bringing section
107(a) claim).
166. See CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1994). In Mathews v. Dow
Chem. Co., the court found that a party with a valid affirmative defense to PRP
liability may bring a claim under section 107 of CERCLA. 947 F. Supp. 1517, 1520
(D. Col. 1996). The court relied on the First Circuit's language in United Technolo-
gies, which indicated that only "innocent" parties were permitted full recovery of
costs under section 107(a). See id. In an effort to determine whether the plaintiff
was "innocent," the court analyzed whether the plaintiffs met each of the three
elements required to establish a valid defense to CERCLA liability under section
107(b) (3), the third party defense. See id. at 1520-21. After finding that all of the
elements had been met, the court allowed the plaintiffs' section 107 claims to pro-
ceed. See id. at 1521.
In Velsicol Chemica4 the Sixth Circuit stated that "section 107 liability is only
barred by a limited number of enumerated causation-based affirmative defenses.
The clear language of § 107(a) and (b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (b), manifests the con-
gressional intent to foreclose any non-enumerated defenses to liability." Velsicol
Chem. Corp. v. Enenco, Inc., 9 F.3d 524, 530 (6th Cir. 1993).
While no circuit court has applied the innocent landowner defense, many
decisions by circuit courts have implied that PRPs must first establish their inno-
cence before they will be permitted to bring actions under section 107(a). See, e.g.,
New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1120 n.2 (3d Cir.
1997) (stating "person who can successfully establish a defense under section
107(b)" is not responsible, and is therefore entitled to bring cost recovery action);
Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1496, 1513-14 (holding parties not qualifying as "inno-
cent" are barred from bringing actions under section 107(a)); Akzo, 30 F.3d at 764
(stating where plaintiff is "in some measure" liable for contamination, claim is for
contribution).
167. See Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1241. The Seventh Circuit held that a landowner
who merely alleges that it did not contribute to the contamination is entitled to
sue under section 107(a). See id.; see also Wolf, Inc. v. L. & W. Serv. Ctr., Inc., No.
4:CV96-3099, 1997 WL 141685, at *8 (D. Neb. Mar. 27, 1997). The court in Wolf
found the facts of its case very similar to the facts in Rumpke. See Wolf, 1997 WL
141685, at *7. For example, the plaintiffs in Wofwere PRPs due to their status as
landowners of the site, they alleged that they did not contribute to the contamina-
tion and they were not the subject of any administrative order by the state or fed-
eral government. See id. at *8. Since the Eighth Circuit had not yet addressed a
case of this nature, the court reasoned that the Seventh Circuit's holding in
Rumpke would guide the decision. See id. Accordingly, the court held that the
plaintiffs could bring an action for cost recovery without first proving their inno-
cence. See id.; cf. New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1116.
In New Castle County, the Third Circuit stated that it would not decide whether
it endorsed "any of the exceptions for 'innocent' landowners" suggested by other
42
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The court's decision in Kaufman supports the use of the affirm-
ative defenses enumerated in section 107(b). 168 Because the re-
lease of hazardous waste in Kaufman was neither the result of an act
of God nor of war, the court held that the plaintiff landowner
would then have to establish that the contamination was the act of a
third party by proving the elements of section 101(35) (B) of CER-
CLA.169 This device "allows a party who acquired property after it
courts, including the Rumpke decision. New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1124. In-
stead, the Third Circuit held that a PRP "under section 107(a), who is not entitled
to any of the defenses enumerated under section 107(b), may not bring a section
107 action against another potentially responsible person." Id. at 1124.
168. See Kaufman, 868 F. Supp. at 1216. The Kaufman court held that the
plaintiff was limited to bringing an action for contribution because it was a PRP,
unless it could establish its innocence under section 107(b). See id. For further
discussion of the facts of Kaufman, see supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
169. See id. at 1216. In order to assert the third party defense, the purchaser
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it "did not know and had no
reason to know" that any hazardous substances existed on the site at the time of
the purchase. CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A). To establish this,
the purchaser "must have undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate
inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good
commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability." Id.
§ 101 (35) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (35) (B). The court in Kaufman acknowledged that
complying with section 101 (35) (B) was necessary for a party to assert its innocence
under section 107(b). See Kaufman, 868 F. Supp. at 1216.
To determine whether the purchaser of a site conducts an appropriate in-
quiry, EPA assesses whether the purchaser conducted a reasonable inspection. See
Fromm et al., supra note 35, at 456. The following is an example of a Phase I
Environmental Site Assessment, which is considered an adequate inquiry of the
site to be purchased:
(1) Conducting a site visit and a walk-through of the property to iden-
tify areas of visual contamination and other issues of concern;
(2) Obtaining information concerning topography, depth to ground-
water (if available), proximity to surface water, potential wetlands
areas, and surrounding land uses;
(3) Obtaining information concerning any industrial processes on the
property and of the presence of USTs, transformers, wells, and
waste disposal activities;
(4) Obtaining information concerning housekeeping problems, spill ar-
eas, the condition of storage of chemicals and wastes, discolored
soils or waters, and unusual odors or vegetative conditions;
(5) Interviewing site personnel to develop information on (a) historical
activities conducted at the site, including spills and disposal activi-
ties, and (b) current discharges of materials or wastes to the soil, air,
and water;
(6) Identifying possible asbestos-containing materials;
(7) Identifying any equipment that may contain polychlorinated
biphenyls;
(8) Reviewing prior land uses through a title search, interviews of rele-
vant persons, and a review of aerial photographs;
(9) Reviewing aerial photographs for indications of problem areas, such
as prior disposal areas or oil and gas usage;
(10) Reviewing agency records for information about the subject site, in-
cluding permitting status, spill notifications, enforcement actions,
1998]
43
McGuire: Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co.: The Potentially Re
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
554 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. IX: p. 5 11
has been contaminated and who did not know or have reason to
know of the contamination to avoid liability on the basis of the [sec-
tion 107(b)] third party defense.' 170
The Seventh Circuit in Rumpke partially relied on the court's
decision in Stearns & Foster Bedding to support its conclusion that if
section 107(a) were read to prohibit "landowners like Rumpke who
did not create the hazardous conditions" from bringing an action
for cost recovery, section 107(a) would face possible elimination. 171
In Stearns & Foster Bedding, the court acknowledged that by applying
this limitation, "[s]lection 107(a) private party plaintiffs will be few
and notifications of waste activities, and discussions with agency rep-
resentatives when warranted;
(11) Reviewing agency files for sites that may affect the subject property,
with files including the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Information System (CERCLIS)
database (identifying sites at which certain hazardous substances
have been disposed of); the National Priorities List (NPL) database
(identifying federal Superfund sites); the Leaking Petroleum Stor-
age Tank (LPST) database; state Superfund databases; and the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) notifier list
(identifying companies that generate, store, treat, or dispose of haz-
ardous wastes);
(12) Searching agency files for well drilling and plugging reports for
properties suspected of being used for oil and gas exploration or
production; and
(13) Obtaining photographs of process equipment and areas of concern,
such as visibly discolored soils.
Id. at 456-57.
170. Kaufman, 868 F. Supp. at 1216 (citing CERCLA § 101 (35) (B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(35) (B)). The court held that the plaintiff would be entitled to bring a
section 107 (a) claim if it could assert that it was an innocent landowner by proving
the following three elements:
(1) it acquired the facility after the initial deposit of the hazardous
substances;
(2) at the time of its acquisition, it did not know and had no reason to
know that any hazardous substance was deposited at the facility; and
(3) once the presence of the hazardous substance became known, it ex-
ercised due care under the circumstances.
Id. (citing CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A); Hemingway Trans.
Inc. v. Kahn, 993 F.2d 915, 932 (1st Cir. 1993)). The court held that if the plaintiff
could not establish its innocence, it would be limited to bringing an action for
contribution under section 113(f). Id.
Similarly, in Boyce v. Bumb, the court acknowledged that because the plaintiffs
were the current owners of a hazardous site, they were PRPs. See 944 F. Supp. 807,
812 (N.D. Cal. 1996). The court asserted that other courts of appeals have recog-
nized that "innocent" parties are entitled to bring actions under section 107(a).
See id. The court, therefore, held that the plaintiffs would be free to bring an
action for cost recovery under section 107(a) of CERCLA if they could "prove
themselves to be non-responsible 'innocent landowners' within the meaning of
§ 9601(35) and § 9607(b)." Id.
171. Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1241.
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and far between." 172 The Stearns & Foster Bedding court found this
result acceptable, however, and held that a PRP is limited to an
action for contribution, unless it can demonstrate that it is "inno-
cent. '17 3 The Seventh Circuit in Rumpke disagreed, finding that the
Stearns & Foster Bedding court's analysis was not only a narrow read-
ing of section 107(a), but also a narrow interpretation of the Akzo
holding. 174 The requirement that a plaintiff PRP must prove itself
innocent under section 107(b) of CERCLA, therefore, was rejected
by the Seventh Circuit, when it held that landowners must simply
allege their innocence. 175
172. Stearns & Foster Bedding Co. v. Franklin Holding Corp., 947 F. Supp.
790, 801 (D.N.J. 1996). The court continued as follows:
Truly innocent private party plaintiffs would be limited to, for example, a
neighbor of a contaminated site who has acted to stem threatened re-
leases for which he is not responsible.... or a party who can claim one of
the complete defenses set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). Few others would
escape CERCLA's strict liability scheme.
Id. (citations omitted).
173. See id. at 801. The court accepted restrictions limiting the capability of
PRPs to bring actions for cost recovery because district courts were granted the
power in section 113 to "apportion liability according to equitable principles
[which] more than adequately protects a PRP who undertakes a clean-up of an-
other party's toxic legacy." Id. The court noted that it would be "unfair to allow
one PRP to burden all the other PRPs," who would then be held jointly and sever-
ally liable for the entire harm, unless those PRPs could establish that the harm was
divisible. Id. The court acknowledged that the plaintiff PRP could proceed with its
section 107(a) action only if it could demonstrate that it was an "innocent" party.
See id.
174. See Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1241. The Seventh Circuit in Rumpke did not
explain why the decision in Stearns & Foster was a narrow interpretation of both
section 107(a) and the decision in Akzo. See id. The Seventh Circuit merely dis-
agreed with the more narrow approach, unpersuaded that it was consistent with
the "broader purpose and structure of CERCLA." Id.
175. See id. The Seventh Circuit regarded Rumpke "as a landowner on whose
property others dumped hazardous materials, before Rumpke even owned the pro-
perty." Id. at 1241-42. This satisfied one of the elements required to assert the
innocent landowner defense. See CERCLA § 101(35)(A)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(35) (A) (1). Perhaps Rumpke also satisfied the second element of the inno-
cent landowner defense because once Rumpke was aware of the hazardous sub-
stances, "it exercised due care under the circumstances" by immediately acting to
eliminate the contamination of the site. See id. § 101(35) (A) (3), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(35) (A) (3). Rumpke, however, was not required to prove that it had "no
reason to know" of the contamination of the site before purchasing it, and thus,
did not satisfy the third element of the innocent landowner defense. See id.
§ 101 (35) (A) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (A) (2). This third requirement is fulfilled
by performing an "appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the
property consistent with good commercial or customary practice." Id.
§ 101 (35) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (B). For a discussion of what constitutes ap-
propriate environmental inspection, see supra note 169.
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B. The Consent Decree
The Seventh Circuit in Rumpke correctly considered the scope
of the consent decree by determining the "matters addressed" by
the decree. 176 Finding no ambiguities in the consent decree, the
Seventh Circuit also correctly applied its previously established
principle that courts should "look to the plain language of the writ-
ten agreement as the best expression of the parties' intent. '177 Ac-
cordingly, the Seventh Circuit appropriately found that the consent
decree offered the Cummins group no protection with respect to
the Uniontown site through its reasoning that the "matters ad-
dressed" in the decree were clearly distinct from the work Rumpke
was performing at the Uniontown site. 178
176. Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1242. The Seventh Circuit once again relied on its
Akzo decision in its analysis of the consent decree. See id. In Akzo, the Seventh
Circuit found that the consent decree provided for long-term, remedial work and
embodied a negotiated settlement, whereas Akzo was required to perform emer-
gency, short-term, removal work. See Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aligner Corp., 30 F.3d
761, 767 (7th Cir. 1994). Additionally, by the time the settling parties had entered
into the consent decree, Akzo had already completed its required work. See id.
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that cleanup activities already completed and paid
for by a private party are unlikely to be addressed in subsequent settlement negoti-
ations. See id. The Seventh Circuit, therefore, held that Akzo's work was clearly
"distinct" from the matters addressed in the consent decree with respect to "kind,
context and time." Id. As a result, the Seventh Circuit found that the contribution
bar under section 113(f) (2) did not apply and Akzo was entitled to seek contribu-
tion from the settling parties of the consent decree. See id. The Seventh Circuit in
Akzo added that the "matters addressed" by a consent decree must be assessed "in a
manner consistent with both the reasonable expectations of the signatories and
the equitable apportionment of costs that Congress has envisioned." Id. at 766.
The Seventh Circuit in Rumpke applied the analysis used in Akzo and found
that Rumpke's work on the Uniontown site was distinct in "kind, context and time"
from the work done at the Seymour site. See Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1242. The Sev-
enth Circuit analyzed the language of the consent decree and found that it re-
ferred specifically to the Seymour site numerous times. See id. The Seventh Circuit
concluded that there was nothing in the consent decree that addressed liability for
wastes "dumped at virtually any or every other spot on the globe, including the
Uniontown landfill." Id. For further discussion of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning,
see supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
177. United States v. City of Northlake, 942 F.2d 1164, 1167 (7th Cir. 1991).
The Seventh Circuit in Northlake acknowledged that if "the plain language of the
writing is unclear, then parol or other extrinsic evidence must be considered in
order to reconstruct the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the
agreement." Id. at 1167. The Seventh Circuit in Rumpke applied its holding in
Northlake and did not permit extrinsic evidence to be admitted. See Rumpke, 107
F.3d at 1242-43; see also United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971)
(stating "the scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its four corners,
and not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to
it").
178. See Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1242-43. The Seventh Circuit noted that
although it is possible that a consent decree may address more than one facility,
the intent to do so must "appear far more plainly in the language of the agreement
than we have here." Id. This is consistent with the Seventh Circuit's holding in
46
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VI. IMPACT
The decision in Rumpke adds a new standard to an issue in
CERCLA liability that has already received inconsistent treatment
by the courts.179 Consequently, the holding does not resolve the
controversy of whether a PRP may bring an action for cost recovery,
and instead creates results which conflict with the established pur-
poses of CERCLA.180
Courts permitting all parties, including PRPs, to bring actions
for cost recovery argue that a holding like that of Rumpke, limiting
who may bring such an action, will reduce a party's incentive to
cooperate in the cleanup procedures.18 1 These courts have rea-
Akzo. See Akzo, 30 F.3d at 770. In Akzo, the Seventh Circuit held that the legislative
intent behind section 113(f)(2) "does not create a blanket prohibition against all
suits for contribution; the bar extends only so far as the 'matters addressed' by the
settlement." Id. The Seventh Circuit in Akzo indicated that the parties to a consent
decree may include provisions protecting the settling parties from actions for con-
tribution for work that would otherwise be outside the scope of the agreement. See
id. at 766 n.8. The Seventh Circuit stated that if the parties do include such provi-
sions, "then those terms will be highly relevant to, and perhaps even dispositive of,
the scope of contribution protection." Id. When the parties do not, however, in-
clude such explicit provisions, the majority in Akzo held that the consent decree
should be construed narrowly by keeping an "eye to the practicalities of the situa-
tion underlying the settlement and the reasonable expectations of the settling par-
ties." Id. at 770.
179. See Kuntz, supra note 134. Troubled by all of the existing controversy
surrounding whether a PRP may bring an action for cost recovery, several legal
scholars have proposed rules in an attempt to create a consistent CERCLA liability
scheme. See generally Hernandez, supra note 8.
180. For a discussion of the goals of CERCLA, see supra note 21 and accompa-
nying text.
181. See, e.g., Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F. Supp.
1100, 1118 (N.D. Ill. 1988). The court in Allied stated the following:
CERCLA seeks the expeditious and safe clean up of hazardous waste sites.
A blanket prohibition against joint and several liability in claims between
responsible parties would discourage a willing PRP from cleaning up on
its own. This is especially true where one or more of the parties are insol-
vent and, thus, incapable of sharing the costs of cleanup .... A prohibi-
tion against joint and several liability would leave the willing PRP holding
the bag for the insolvent companies. On the other hand, a willing PRP
would be encouraged to clean up where the law leaves open the possibil-
ity that the PRP could recover all costs as against nonwilling, solvent PRPs
under a theory of joint and several liability.
Id. In Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., the court found that
allowing PRPs to bring claims for cost recovery creates "an incentive for private
parties to clean up hazardous waste sites, to risk their own capital initially, knowing
that by then prevailing in a section 107 action, they will be reimbursed perhaps in
excess of what might be shown in a section 113 action to have been their equitable
share." 814 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting United States v. Kramer,
757 F. Supp. 397, 416-17 (D.N.J. 1991)).
Some commentators have reasoned that allowing PRPs to pursue cost recovery
actions will act as an incentive for parties to enter into settlements. See Panzer,
supra note 3, at 478. "If PRPs can recover on ajoint and several basis against other
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soned that "permitting [PRPs] to raise their section 107(a) claims
comports with CERCLA's goal of encouraging parties to initiate
cleanup operations promptly and voluntarily. ' 18 2 Additionally,
these courts have found that by not allowing all parties the opportu-
nity to recover all of their losses incurred in a cleanup, the incen-
tive to challenge EPA will be increased.' s3
Moreover, holding that only landowner PRPs, who did not
cause the contamination, may bring section 107(a) claims without
requiring them to meet the elements of the innocent landowner
defense, also adversely affects CERCLA's goals.' 84  Rumpke
purchased the Uniontown site after it had already been contami-
nated and did not discover the contamination until approximately
five years after becoming the owner.'8 5 Such a lapse of time in the
recognition of the contamination would have precluded Rumpke
from establishing the innocent landowner defense.18 6
PRPs, those who the EPA target will more readily settle with the government and
begin the cleanup process." Id.
182. Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., 891 F. Supp. 221, 225 (E.D.
Pa. 1995). Any unfairness in imposing the joint and several liability of the cost
recovery action can be "remedied" through an action for contribution. See id.; see
also Adhesives Research Inc. v. American Inks & Coatings Corp., 931 F. Supp. 1231,
1246 (M.D. Pa. 1996). In Adhesives Research, the court held that by allowing PRPs to
utilize section 107, the broad remedial goals of CERCLA would be effectuated "by
encouraging parties to promptly and voluntarily initiate cleanup or settlement,
and discouraging parties from refusing to participate in voluntary cleanup efforts
or avoiding settlement." Adhesives Research, 931 F. Supp. at 1246. The court rea-
soned that PRPs permitted to pursue cost recovery actions would have greater mo-
tivation to initiate the cleanup process voluntarily than if PRPs were only allowed
to pursue actions for contribution. See id.; see also Pneumo Abex Corp. v. Bessemer
& Lake Erie R.R. Co., 921 F. Supp. 336, 347 (E.D. Va. 1996) (stating PRPs pursuing
section 107 actions will preserve "the statute's incentives for PRPs to settle and
settle early"); Companies for Fair Allocation v. Axil Corp., 853 F. Supp. 575, 579
(D. Conn. 1994) (finding that limitations on PRPs in contribution actions may
discourage PRPs from engaging in site cleanup where they might otherwise have
initiated cleanup).
183. See Panzer, supra note 3, at 478. Parties will assess their chances of recov-
ering the costs that will be incurred in a hazardous site cleanup before they begin
the work. See id. If they perceive a high risk of having to cover all of the costs, they
are likely to challenge EPA's order to clean up the site. See id.
184. For a discussion of the courts requiring a plaintiff PRP to establish a
defense to liability before bringing an action under section 107(a), see supra notes
165-75 and accompanying text.
185. See Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 107 F.3d 1235,
1236 (7th Cir. 1997). Prior to purchasing the site, Rumpke did not perform an
environmental inspection of its own. See id. at 1236. Instead, Rumpke relied on
the previous owners' promises that no hazardous wastes had been accepted at the
site. See id.
186. SeeCERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1994). In order to assert the
third party defense under section 107(b) (3), a PRP must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that it did not, and should not have known about the contam-
ination of the site prior to its purchase. See id. § 101(35) (A), 42 U.S.C.
[Vol. IX: p. 511
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By allowing the landowner to escape the strict liability that is
imposed on PRPs, the Seventh Circuit has minimized the effect of
section 107(a)(1) liability.18 7 The Seventh Circuit's decision in
Rumpke, therefore, does not resolve the controversy of a PRP bring-
ing an action for cost recovery under section 107(a). In fact, the
decision creates results which negatively impact the goals of CER-
CLA and can be interpreted as undermining the strict liability im-
posed by CERCLA.
Christine D. McGuire
§ 9601 (35) (A). To satisfy this requirement, the PRP must have performed an "ap-
propriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent
with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability." Id.
§ 101 (35) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B). The contamination of the Uniontown
site, therefore, would have been discovered approximately five years earlier if
Rumpke had performed such an inquiry. Delaying the cleanup of a contaminated
site is not consistent with CERCLA's goals. SeeJudith S. Kavanaugh & William L.
Earl, CERCLA Investor Liability: "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Won't Work, 71 FLA. B.J. 56, 57
(1997) (discussing CERCLA's goals are to encourage site purchasers to be in-
formed and responsible, and to make purchasing with "passive ignorance a liabil-
ity"). For a discussion of the "appropriate inquiry" that should be performed by a
purchaser, see supra note 169.
187. Rumpke is a PRP by virtue of being the current owner of the hazardous
site. See Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1240-41. CERCLA imposes strict liability on four cate-
gories of PRPs, including current owners of a site. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a). For a discussion of how the strict liability component has been treated
by other courts, see supra notes 161-64.
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